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ABSTRACT 
 
Misuse Intrusion Detection Systems are rule-based systems that search attack 
patterns in the data source. Detection ability of misuse detectors is limited to known 
attack patterns; hence unknown attacks may be missed. In addition, writing new 
signatures for novel attacks can be troublesome and time consuming. Similarly behavior 
based IDSs suffered from high rates of false alarms. Artificial neural networks have 
generalization ability, thus they can be used with intrusion detection system in order to 
identify normal and attack packets without the need of writing rules. We proposed to 
use neural networks with network-based IDS. To achieve this, system was trained and 
tested with both normal and malicious network packets. Backpropagation and 
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithms were used to train neural networks. For each of these 
training algorithms a 3-layer and a 4-layer MLP network sets were generated. In 
addition, self-organizing maps were used to classify attack instances. DARPA 1999 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset was used for training and testing, but lack of 
enough attack patterns in evaluation dataset made us to create a testbed to obtain 
sufficient malicious traffic. After training was completed, trained neural networks were 
tested against training dataset and test dataset, which is not part of the training dataset. 
Results of the experiments showed that, none of the trained backpropagation networks 
could identify attacks in training and/or testing data sets. But results of the Levenberg-
Marquardt networks were more promising as nine of the trained Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks could identify attack and normal network packets in training and test datasets. 
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ÖZET 
 
Kötüye kullanım tespit sistemleri, kural tabanlı sistemler olup veri kaynaı 
içerisindeki saldırı desenlerini arar. Kötüye kullanım tespit sistemlerinin tespit 
kabiliyetleri sahip oldukları saldırı desenleri ile sınırlıdır. Ek olarak her yeni saldırı için 
bir saldırı imzası tanımlamak zahmetli ve zaman alıcı bir süreçtir. Benzer olarak 
davranı tabanlı nüfuz tespit sistemleri de yüksek oranlarda yanlı alarmlarla sorun 
yaamaktadır. Yapay sinir alarının nüfuz tespit sistemlerinde kullanılmasıyla bir saldırı 
kuralı tanımlamaya gerek kalmadan normal ve saldırı paketlerinin tanınması 
salanabilir.  
Bu çalıma yapay sinir alarının nüfuz tespit sistemlerinde kullanılmasını 
kapsamaktadır. Bu amaca ulaabilmek için yapay sinir aları hem saldırı hem de normal 
a paketleriyle eitilmitir. Geri yayılım algoritması ve Levenberg-Marquardt eitim 
algoritmaları yapay sinir alarının eitilmesinde kullanılmıtır. Her bir eitim 
algoritması için biri 3-katmanlı biri de 4-katmanlı olmak üzere iki grup çok düzeyli 
algılayıcı aları yaratılmıtır. Çok düzeyli algılayıcı alara ek olarak kendi kendini 
organize eden yapay sinir aları da saldırıları gruplandırmak için kullanılmıtır. Eitim 
ve test için 1999 DARPA Nüfuz Tespit Sistemleri Deerlendirme veri seti 
kullanılmıtır. Ancak bu veri setindeki saldırı paketlerinin sayısının yapay sinir alarını 
eitimi için yetersiz kalmasından dolayı, saldırı paketleri bir simülasyon ortamında 
yaratılmıtır. Eitilen yapay sinir aları, eitim veri seti ve eitim veri setinin içinde 
olmayan verilerin bulunduu bir test veri setiyle test edilmitir. Deney sonuçlarında geri 
yayılım algoritması ile eitilen yapay sinir alarının eitim ve/veya test veri setindeki 
normal ve saldırı paketlerini ayrıt etmede baarısız kaldıı gözlemlenmitir. Levenberg-
Marquardt algoritması ile eiten dokuz yapay sinir aı, eitim ve test veri setindeki 
saldırı ve normal paketleri ayırt edebilmeyi baarmıtır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Automated attacking tools and high availability of these tools on Internet have 
raised the need of computer security systems. Firewalls and security policies are the 
first defense lines in order to protect computer systems and prevent attackers to harm 
computer systems. However, building a complete secure computer system is still a 
dream. This is due to the fact that, application programs will always contain unknown 
bugs and vulnerabilities. In addition, attackers continuously find new techniques to 
exploit vulnerabilities in the computer systems. Hence, despite the security precautions, 
computer attacks are continuously increasing (attack incidents reported to CERT 
(WEB_1 2005) by year is given in Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1. CERT reported incidents by year. 
 
 Electronic commerce became widespread; hence attacks to the computer 
systems could result in loss of billions of dollars. Worldwide economic cost of the 
malicious codes is $0.5 billion in 1995, $1.8 billion in 1996, $3.3 billion in 1997, $6.1 
billion in 1998, $12.1 billion in 1999, $17.1 billion in 2000 and $13.2 billion in 2001. 
Major incidents related to the viruses, worms and other malicious software are given in 
Table 1.1 (WEB_2 2005). 
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Table 1.1. Economic impact of malicious code. 
 
Name Date Impact 
Morris Worm 1988 • Stopped 10% of computers 
connected to Internet 
Melissa Virus May 1999 • 100,000 computers in one week 
• Loss of $1.5 billion  
Explorer Virus June 1999 • Loss of $1.1 billion 
Love Bug Virus May 2000 • Loss of $8.75 billion 
Sircam Virus July 2001 • 2.3 million computers infected 
• Loss of $1.25 billion 
Code Red Worm July 2001 
• 359,000 computers infected in less 
than 14 hours 
• Loss of $2.75 billion 
Nimda Worm Sept. 2001 
• 160,000 computers infected at 
peak 
• Loss of $1.5 billion  
Klez 2002 • Loss of $750 million 
BugBear 2002 • Loss of $500 million 
Badtrands 2002 • Loss of $400 million 
Sapphire/Slammer 
Worm Jan. 2003 
• Infected 90% of vulnerable hosts 
in just 10 minutes 
• 75,000 hosts infected at peak 
• Loss of $1.5 billion 
Blaster 2003 • Loss of $750 million 
Nachi 2003 • Loss of $500 million 
SoBig.F 2003 • Loss of $2.5 billion 
MyDoom Worm Jan. 2004 
• Fastest spreading mass-mailer 
worm to date 
• 100,000 instances of the worm 
intercepted per hour 
• Loss of more than $4.0 billion 
Witty Worm March 2004 • First widely propagated worm to 
carry a destructive payload 
 
 A computer system should provide confidentially, integrity and availability 
against attempts try to exploit vulnerabilities in the operating system and in application 
programs. Confidentially is the protection of private information from disclosure of 
unauthorized users. Integrity is the protection of the sensitive data from modification of 
unauthorized users and availability states that data can be accessible any time by the 
legitimate users. 
 If certain countermeasures are taken, most of the intrusions can be prevented, as 
most of them are results of known vulnerabilities. However, it is still impossible to 
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secure the complete computer system, as there will be always unknown security 
breaches. Consequently, it is important to detect intrusions or intrusion attempts in order 
to take precautions as to prevent similar intrusions. This research field is called 
intrusion detection. 
 The notion of intrusion detection was born with Anderson’s paper, “Computer 
Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance”, in the beginning of 1980. In his seminal 
paper, written for a government organization, Anderson suggested using audit trails to 
track computer misuses and to understand user behavior. With release of the paper, 
concepts of detecting misuse and user activities emerged. Since then, many researches 
have been conducted and intrusion detection systems have been significantly improved. 
Timeline of the evolution of intrusion detection systems is given in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Timeline of the evolution of intrusion detection systems. 
 
 In 1983, Denning in SRI International conducted a study to create user profiles 
by analyzing audit trails of the government mainframe computers. One year later the 
first prototype for intrusion detection, the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) 
was formed with the help of Denning. IDES analyzes audit trails from government 
systems and tracks user activity. IDES provided a foundation to the intrusion detection 
development. In 1987, Denning published a paper, “An Intrusion Detection Model”, for 
the 1986 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy and explained how anomalous 
activity could be used as an indicator of potential security incidents. 
 The Haystack prototype was developed for the detection of intrusions in a multi-
user Air Force computer system at University of California Davis' Lawrence Livermore 
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Laboratories in 1988. The prototype Intrusion Detection System (IDS) analyzes audit 
data by comparing it with defined patterns. 
 In 1989, the developers of Haystack established the commercial company, 
Haystack Labs, and developed “last” technology intrusion detection system, Stalker. 
Stalker is a host-based, pattern matching system which can manually and automatically 
query the audit data. 
 In 1990, Todd Heberlein, a student at the University of California, introduced 
the idea of network intrusion detection and built an IDS system called Network Security 
Monitor (NSM) which was the first network intrusion detection system. NSM listens 
passively network traffic that passes through a broadcast LAN, and extracts intrusive 
behavior from this input. NSM can monitor a network of heterogeneous hosts without 
having to convert different audit trail formats into a standard format. 
 The Air Force's Cryptologic Support Center developed the Automated Security 
Measurement System (ASIM) to monitor network traffic on the US Air Force's network. 
ASIM considerably improved scalability and portability issues that previous network 
intrusion detection products suffered. 
 The development group on the ASIM project formed a commercial company in 
1994, the Wheel Group. Their product, NetRanger, scans traffic for signature of misuse, 
provides real-time alarm and gives details of the attacks. However, during these years 
development of commercial intrusion detection systems slowed down and only speeded 
up again around 1997. 
 ISS developed a network intrusion detection system called RealSecure in 1997. 
A year later, Cisco recognized the importance of network intrusion detection and 
purchased the Wheel Group. Similarly, the first host-based intrusion detection company, 
Centrax Corporation, was formed. 
 In the last few years, the intrusion detection field has grown considerably and 
therefore a large number of IDSs have been developed. The initial IDSs were anomaly 
detection tools but today, most of the commercial IDSs are misuse detection tools. IDSs 
have become a necessity, as number of computer systems connected to networks 
increased greatly. 
 The goal of this research is to propose and analyze the applicability of neural 
networks in the field of intrusion detection. Proposed neural network based intrusion 
detection system is network-based in the sense that, it uses network data to determine 
whether an intrusion has taken place. 
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 Remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Basic concepts of intrusion 
detection, neural networks and information about DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation are given in chapter two. Employing neural networks in the field of intrusion 
detection and related works are given in chapter three. Methodology used in this 
research is described in chapter four. The results that are obtained in the experiments in 
this research are examined in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 This chapter presents basic technical background of intrusion detection systems, 
neural networks, 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation and its dataset, which is 
used to train and test the proposed system. 
 
2.1. Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
 Pioneering work in the field of intrusion detection was performed by Anderson 
in the early 1980s. Anderson defines an intrusion as any unauthorized attempt to access, 
manipulate, modify, or destroy information, or to render a system unreliable or unusable 
(Anderson 1980). Intrusions are caused by attackers accessing the systems from 
Internet, authorized users of the systems who attempt to gain additional privileges for 
which they are not authorized, and authorized users who misuse the privileges given to 
them. IDSs are software or hardware products that monitor the system in question and 
try to detect any attack against the system. 
 A truly secure system is still a dream, as there are always bugs in application 
programs, and also communication protocols always have vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by attackers. In addition, passwords can be cracked, users can loose their 
passwords, and entire crypto system can be broken. As a result, security mechanisms 
(e.g. firewalls), which are deployed to protect the information system, may not be able 
to prevent all security breaches. IDSs are usually deployed along with the other security 
mechanisms, such as access control, authentication and firewalls, as a last defense line 
to improve security of the information system. 
 The main goal of an IDS is to provide high rates of attack detection with very 
small rates of false alarms. There are two types of errors that are important to know in 
intrusion detection: 
• False positives: False positives are the errors occurring when IDS flags a normal 
activity as an attack. Simply, false positives are false alarms. 
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•  False negatives: False negatives are the errors occurring when IDS fails to 
detect an ongoing attack. 
 An intrusion detection system consists of three functional components (Bace and 
Mell 2001), namely: 
1. Information source that provides a stream of event records; 
2. Analysis engine that finds signs of intrusions; and 
3. Response component that generates reactions based on the outcome of the analysis 
engine. 
 In the following subsections these three functional components are inspected in 
detail. 
 
2.1.1. Information Sources  
 
 The first component of an IDS is the data source, where input information, 
which will be analyzed, is collected. Input information can be audit trails, system logs 
or network packets. According to the data sources used, IDSs can be classified into two 
categories, host-based IDSs and network-based IDSs. 
 
2.1.1.1. Host-based IDSs 
 
Host-based IDSs monitor activities within an individual computer system and 
operate on information obtained from these activities. As target environment was 
mainframe environment, and all users were local to the system, first researches in the 
field of IDSs were performed on the host-based IDSs. 
Host-based IDSs generally use two information sources, operating system audit 
trails, and system logs. Operating system trails are usually generated at the kernel level; 
hence they are more detailed and better protected than system logs. However, system 
logs are simpler and smaller than operating system trails; consequently they can be 
more easily interpreted. 
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2.1.1.1.1. Advantages of Host-based IDSs 
 
1. As host-based IDSs monitor local activities, thus they can detect attack that can 
not be detected by network-based IDSs. 
2. Information sources of the host-based IDSs are generally generated on a 
plaintext data, therefore they can successfully operate in an environment where 
network traffic is encrypted. 
3. Performance of the host-based IDSs is not affected by the topology of the 
network they operate in. They successfully operate on switched networks. 
 
2.1.1.1.2. Disadvantages of Host-based IDSs 
 
1. As host-based IDSs should be placed on every monitored host, it is harder to 
manage and configure host-based IDSs. 
2. Host-based IDSs run on the host targeted by attacks, and it may be disabled by a 
successful attack. Such as by certain denial-of-service attacks. 
3. As host-based IDSs can only see network packets received by its host, detection 
performance of host-based IDSs is poor in the case attacks are targeted to the 
entire network. 
4. Amount of information used by host-based IDSs can be huge; hence host–based 
IDSs may require additional storage on the system running. 
5. Host-base IDSs share the computing resources (e.g. CPU, main memory) with 
the monitored host. Consequently, they cost additional operational overheads 
and may affect the performance of the hosting computer. 
 
2.1.1.2. Network-based IDSs 
 
As computing environments shifted from mainframe to the networks of 
workstations, studies on intrusion detection started to focus on attacks targeted to the 
network. Network attacks can not be detected by examining operating system trails or 
system logs, or at least detection of network attacks by examining data sources on the 
host computer is not an easy task. As a result, network-based IDSs were developed, 
which sniff network packets and search attacks in these network packets. Network-
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based IDSs monitor activities on a network segment or switch, so that they can protect 
hosts connected to the monitored segment. Network-based IDSs generally consist of 
sensors which are placed at various points (such as at LAN and WAN backbones) in the 
network. As sensors are limited to run IDS, they can run in “stealth” mode, therefore 
they can be more secured against attacks. 
 
2.1.1.2.1. Advantages of Network-based IDSs 
 
1. A large network can be monitored easily by employing a few numbers of 
sensors, if sensors are placed at the critical parts of the network (for example at 
hubs, routers or probes). 
2. Network-based IDSs are generally passive devices and run in stealth mode, 
hence do not affect the normal operation of the network. 
3. Network-based IDSs can be very secure against attacks, and even they can be 
made invisible to the attackers. 
 
2.1.1.2.2. Disadvantages of Network-based IDSs 
 
1. If monitored network is large or network traffic is high, it may be difficult to 
process all network packets. 
2. Problems arise when network-based IDSs placed on a switched network. Most 
switches do not provide universal monitoring ports and this fact limits the 
monitoring ability of network-based IDS. 
3. Network-based IDSs can not analyze encrypted traffic. This is due to the fact 
that, the sensors analyze packet headers to determine source and destination 
addresses and type of data being transmitted, and analyze the packet payload to 
discover information in the data being transmitted. 
4. Malformed network packets may cause a network-based IDS to crash. 
 
2.1.2. IDS Analysis 
 
Second component of the intrusion detection system is the analysis engine, 
where decision of whether the monitored activity is an attack or not is taken. Intrusion 
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detection analysis engines are generally classified into two categories: misuse detection 
and anomaly detection. 
 
2.1.2.1. Anomaly Detection 
 
Anomaly detectors assume that misuse or intrusions are highly correlated to 
abnormal behavior of either a user or a system (Ghosh and Schwartzbard 1999). 
Anomaly detection approaches must first baseline the normal behavior of the object 
being monitored, and then detect possible intrusions by using deviations from this 
baseline. These profiles are constructed from historical data collected over a period of 
time of normal operation. Anomaly detection typically creates knowledge bases 
containing the profiles of the monitored users, programs or systems. Threshold 
detection, statistical measures, neural networks and rule-based measures are the 
techniques used in anomaly detection. A block diagram of a typical anomaly detection 
system is given in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. Block diagram of a typical anomaly detection system. 
 
2.1.2.1.1. Advantages of Anomaly IDSs 
 
1. As any significant deviation from normal profile will be flagged as anomalous, 
anomaly detectors can detect unknown attacks. 
2. Anomaly detectors do not require constant updating of rules or signatures of 
novel intrusion. 
3. Anomaly detectors can produce information that can in turn be used to define 
signatures for misuse detectors. 
 
Attack 
State 
Update Profile 
Generate New Profile 
Deviation 
Audit Data System Profile 
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2.1.2.1.2. Disadvantages of Anomaly IDSs 
 
1. The high false positive rate is the main drawback of the anomaly IDSs. This is 
due to the fact that, the normal profile of a system can not be fully learned 
and/or behavior of users or programs may change over time. 
2. In order to build normal profile of a system, system in question should be 
monitored and information should be collected, which in turn will be used to 
draw normal behavior of the system. But if the collected information contains 
attacks, intrusive behavior will be a part of the normal profile, and in future 
these attacks will go undetected. 
3. Anomaly detection approaches need extensive data sets to build profile of the 
system. 
 
2.1.2.2. Misuse Detection  
 
Misuse detectors attempt to model attacks on a system as specific patterns, then 
look for events or sets of events that match a predefined pattern of events that describe a 
known attack (Ghosh and Schwartzbard 1999). As the patterns corresponding to known 
attacks are called signatures, misuse detection is sometimes called “signature-based 
detection”. Expert systems, signature verification and state transition diagrams are the 
techniques used in misuse detection. While anomaly detection typically utilizes 
threshold monitoring, misuse detection techniques frequently utilize a rule-based 
approach. Today most of the commercial and research intrusion detection tools are 
misuse detection which are based on attack signatures. A block diagram of typical 
misuse detection system is given in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 2.2. Block diagram of a typical misuse detection system. 
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2.1.2.2.1. Advantages of Misuse IDSs 
 
1. Misuse IDSs can detect intrusion with a certain degree of certainty. Misuse 
detectors are very effective in detecting attacks without giving high false alarm 
rates. 
2. Misuse IDSs can detect all intrusions whose signatures are known.  
3. Misuse IDSs are easy to implement (state machine, signature analysis) and 
deploy (no need to form a profile of the system). 
 
2.1.2.2.2. Disadvantages of Misuse IDSs 
 
1. Detection ability of misuse detectors is limited to signatures that they posses. A 
new intrusion or even a variation of a known intrusion may be undetected. So 
misuse IDs require regular updates of signatures in order to remain current. 
2. The process of developing a new attack signature is time consuming. 
 
2.1.3. Response Component 
 
 Response component is the third component of an IDS , where reaction to a 
detected attack is given. According to the response types IDS can be either active or 
passive. An IDS is said to be active, if it actively reacts to the attack by taking 
corrective (closing holes) or proactive (logging out possible attackers, closing down 
services). If an IDS just generates alarms, it is said to be passive. Passive IDS responses 
provide information to system administrator who takes necessary actions based on that 
information. 
 
2.2. Neural Networks 
 
 Modern digital computers can perform thousands of operations in a second and 
numerical computation power of human brain is far below the digital computers. 
However, even the most powerful computers can not compete with humans when 
performing some perceptual tasks (recognition of a face in crowd for example). Power 
of human brain, enabling human to outperform the digital computers in completing 
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some tasks, comes from the fact that human brain is composed of large number of 
massively interconnected computing units, so called neurons. 
 Inspired from biological neural networks, artificial neural networks are 
massively parallel computing systems consisting of an extremely large number of 
simple processors (called neurons) with many interconnections and coefficients 
associated with interconnections (weights) (Jain et al. 1996). An artificial neural 
network (or simply neural network) is a computational model that can be defined by 
four parameters (Kasabov 1996): 
 1. Models of neurons. 
 2. Architecture. 
 3. Learning algorithm. 
 4. Recall algorithm. 
 Neural networks have many characteristics that neither traditional Von Neuman 
nor modern parallel computers have. These characteristics include massively parallel 
computation, learning ability, generalization ability, adaptivity, and fault tolerance. 
 
2.2.1. Models of Neurons 
 
Major components of neuronal model are given in Figure 2.3. Three basic 
elements constitute the neuron model, which are connection links, an adder and an 
activation function. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Major components of an artificial neuron. 
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 Two neurons are connected with each other with a connection link (or synapse) 
and each connection link is associated with a weight which determines the computing 
effect of the neuron on whole neural network. Each of the neurons, xj, is multiplied with 
the weight, wkj, associated with the link that connects neuron xj to another neuron k. 
These products are summed and presented to an activation or transfer function, which is 
used to limit the amplitude of the output. The most popular activation functions are 
given in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Most popular activation functions. 
 
 In order to increase or decrease the net input of the activation function, a bias 
(θk) is externally applied to neuron k. In mathematical terms, a neuron k can be 
described by the following pair of equations: 
 
j
m
1j
kjk xws ⋅=
=
 (2.1) 
 
and 
 
)  f(s  y kkk +=  (2.2) 
 
where x1,x2,....,xm are the input signals, wk1, wk2, ..., wkm are the synaptic weights of 
neuron k; sk is the linear combiner output due to the input signals; θk is the bias; f(.) is 
the activation function; and yk is the output produced by the neuron. 
 In order to make formula 2.2 uniform, generally bias is assumed to be an input 
unit, x0, which has a weight value, wk0, of 1. Then the formula 2.1 will be 
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2.2.2. Neural Network Architectures 
 
 Topology of a neural network describes the organization of connections between 
neurons. Neurons in a neural network can be fully connected, where every neuron is 
connected to every other neuron, or can be partially connected. 
 Architectures of neural networks can be grouped into two categories: (i) 
Feedforward networks, where data is strictly propagated from input units to output units 
in feed-forward manner, hence there exists neither feedback connections nor loops in 
the network. Feedforward neural networks are memoryless systems in the sense that 
state of the network is not affected by the previous produced outputs; (ii) Feedback (or 
recurrent) networks contain feed-back connections, hence loops exist within these 
networks. 
 In our experiments two different architectures are used. These architectures are 
multi-layer perceptron network which is a feedforward network and self-organizing 
maps, which is a recurrent network. In the following sections these architectures are 
explained in detail. 
 
2.2.2.1. Multi-Layer Perceptron 
 
 Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) has an input layer of source nodes and output 
layer of neurons. These two layers connect the neural network to the outside world; 
training set is presented to the MLP through input layer and output produced by the 
neural network exists in the output layer. In addition to these two layers, MLP has one 
or more hidden layers which can not be directly accessible through the outside world. A 
sample MLP network with two hidden layers is given in Figure 2.5. 
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 A layer of processing elements makes independent computations on data that it 
receives and passes the results to another layer. The next layer may in turn make its 
independent computations and pass on the results to another layer. Finally, a group of 
one or more processing elements determines the output from the network. Each 
processing element makes its computation based upon a weighted sum of its inputs. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. A MLP network with two hidden layers. 
 
A L-layer MLP network consists of an input stage, (L-1) hidden layers and an 
output layer connected in a feedforward manner without any feedback connections 
between neurons (Jain et al. 1996). 
 MLP networks can be successfully trained, even if training examples are linearly 
inseparable (input patterns cannot be separated into the output categories by a single 
line). One of the most popular training algorithms used in MLPs is backpropagation 
algorithm, which is described in section 2.2.3.1. 
 Training process of MLP networks continues until a certain number of iterations 
or a desired error rate is reached. The most common error approximation method used 
in MLP networks is mean square error (MSE) and it is defined by the following 
formula: 
 
/2y) - (d Err 2=  (2.5) 
 
 17 
where d is the desired output for the given input and y is the output produced by the 
neural network.. A total MSE sums the error over all individual examples and all the 
output neurons in the network. 
.m p / ))y - (d  MSE
1
1 k 
m
1  j
2(k)
j
(k)
j 







= 
= =
 (2.6) 
where yj(k) is the output value of the jth output of the network when kth training example 
is presented; dj(k) is the desired output for the jth output for the kth training example; p is 
the number of training examples in the training data; and m is the number of output 
neurons in the neural network. Root-mean square error (RMSE) is the root of the MSE. 
 
2.2.2.2. Self Organizing Maps 
 
 The term self-organizing refers to that; these networks can adapt their weights 
without giving any correct answers. Self-organizing maps (SOMs) modify connection 
weights based on the characteristics of the training set. A SOM consists of two layers, 
an input layer and an output layer (also called feature map), which represents the output 
vectors. The weights of the connections of an output neuron j to all the other n input 
neurons form a vector wj in an n dimensional space. SOMs are trained to cluster input 
vectors sharing the same features. Similar input vectors are represented by near neurons 
in the feature map. (Kasabov 1996). The idea behind the learning in SOMs is that, the 
neuron whose weight vector was closest to the input vector is updated to be even closer. 
An example of SOM network is given in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. An example of self-organizing map network. 
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 In the first step of the learning, all weight vectors are initialized such that values 
of all weight vectors are assigned differently. From the set of input vectors, a sample 
input vector, x, is selected and each neuron computes Euclidean distance (which is the 
straight line distance between two points) between its weight vector and sample input 
vector (Formula 2.7).  
 
, ...,l, j  21   , w x(n)min arg  i(x) jj =−=
 
(2.7) 
 
 The weight vector which has the minimum Euclidean distance, hence most 
similar to sample input vector, is called best-matching or winning neuron.  
 Only the winning neuron and its neighbors gain the right to update their weights. 
Weight vectors are updated by the following formula: 
 
(n)) w (n)(x(n)(n)h  (n) w 1)(nw ji(x) j,jj −+=+
 
(2.8) 
 
where (n) is the learning-rate parameter, and hj, i(x)(n) is the neighborhood function 
around the winning neuron i(x). Both (n) and hj, i(x)(n) changes dynamically during the 
learning process. While initial neighborhood size is often set to 1/2 to 2/3 of the 
network size, it shrinks exponentially with time. 
 
2.2.3. Learning in Neural Networks 
 
 In the context of neural networks, learning is the process of updating connection 
weights so that the neural network can perform a desired task efficiently. A neural 
network is trained so that it produces set of desired output vectors Y, from a given set of 
input vectors X. The set X, which is used to train the neural network, is called training 
set, and elements of X are called training examples. Performance is improved over time 
by iteratively updating the weights in the network. 
 There are three main learning algorithms (Jain et al. 1996): 
1. Supervised. In supervised learning, beside from the training set, desired 
outputs of the given training set is presented to the neural network. Aim of 
the supervised learning is minimizing the difference between the output 
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produced by the network and the desired output by altering the values of the 
connection weights. 
2. Unsupervised. Correct answers associated with each training example is not 
required in unsupervised learning and only training set is presented to the 
neural network. In unsupervised learning, correlations within the training set 
are explored, and data are clustered based on these correlations. Self-
organizing maps utilize unsupervised learning. 
3. Hybrid. Hybrid learning combines supervised and unsupervised learning. 
Some parts of the weights are updated in supervised manner and the others 
are updated through unsupervised learning. 
 
2.2.3.1. Backpropagation Algorithm 
 
 One of the most popular supervised learning algorithms is the back propagation 
algorithm. The algorithm consists of two phases: Forward phase and backward phase. 
In the forward phase, first, the weights of the network are randomly initialized. Then, 
the input signals are propagated through the network. Afterwards, the output of the 
network is calculated and compared to the desired value. In the end of the forward 
phase, the error of the network is calculated. Error of the output neuron i (ei) is 
calculated by the formula: 
 
iii y d e −=  (2.9) 
 
where di is the desired response and yi is the output produces by the neural network in 
response to the input xi. 
 Aim of the backpropagation algorithm is to reach global minimum value (Figure 
2.7) on the error surface.  
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Figure 2.7. Global and local minimum in error surface. 
 
 In backward phase, calculated error signal is propagated backward and in order 
to minimize the error, weights are updated. Change in weights can be calculated by 
gradient descent learning rule (Haykin 1999).According to the gradient descent learning 
rule, correction applied to the weight wji at the iteration n is denoted by wji(n), and 
calculated by 
 
(n)y(n)	  (n)w ijji =  (2.10) 
 
where  is a numerical constant (learning-rate parameter of the backpropagation 
algorithm) and δj(n) is local gradient.  
 Local gradient of output neurons is equal to the product of the derivative of 
activation function, f
(), and error signal, ej(n), and defined by  
 
(n))(sf(n)e (n)	 j'jj =  (2.11) 
 
 Local gradient of the hidden neurons is associated with derivative of the 
activation function and local gradient of the next hidden layer or output layer. Local 
gradient for neurons in hidden layers is defined by 
 
(n)w(n)	(n))(sf (n)	 kj
k
kj
'
j =  (2.12) 
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Learning rate parameter, , is used to abridge the training time. But if the 
learning rate parameter is chosen too high (e.g. 0.9), algorithm oscillate between local 
minimums, and may not achieved to reach the global minimum, whereas selecting 
learning rate too small results in long training periods. One way to speed up the learning 
when learning rate is chosen small or avoid oscillation between local minimums when 
learning rate is chosen to big is to utilize a parameter, momentum. By introducing the 
momentum parameter, change in weight, wji(n), is made dependent to the previous 
weight change, wji(n-1). Modified backpropagation algorithm which uses momentum, 
, is given in formula 2.13. 
 
1)-(n w  (n)(n)y	   )(n w ijijij +=  (2.13) 
 
 After the training was completed, connection weights are frozen. Afterwards, in 
order to validate whether the neural network was trained sufficiently or not, a test set, 
which is not part of the training set, was presented to the trained network and its 
performance is evaluated. 
 Backpropagation algorithm is simple to implement. However when dealing with 
difficult learning tasks, training time of the backpropagation networks can be lengthy 
and even algorithm may not converge to the desired error rate. 
 
2.2.3.2. Levenberg-Marquardt Algorithm 
 
 Levenberg-Marquardt is an advanced non-linear optimization algorithm (Hagan 
and Menhaj 1994). It can be used to update the weights in the network just as 
backpropagation algorithm. It is reputably the fastest algorithm available for such 
training. 
 The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm is designed specifically to minimize the 
sum-of-squares error function, using a formula that (partly) assumes that the underlying 
function modeled by the network is linear. A move is only accepted if it improves the 
error, and if necessary the gradient-descent model is used with a sufficiently small step 
to guarantee downhill movement. The weight update vector x is calculated as 
 
[ ]
  )x(J I  ))J(x(J x T1T ε−+= x  (2.14) 
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where  is the vector of errors,  is the learning rate parameter, and J(x) is the Jacobian 
matrix that is the matrix of partial derivatives of the errors with respect to the weights. 
Jacobian matrix can be calculated with the following formula: 
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 Levenberg-Marquardt outperforms the basic backpropagation and its variations 
with variable learning rate in terms of training time and accuracy. However the 
computation and memory requirements of the algorithm are high. 
 
2.3. DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation 
 
In 1998 and in 1999, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) made an evaluation among commercial and research intrusion detection 
research projects. To date, it is the most comprehensive scientific study known for 
evaluating different intrusion detection systems. DARPA study highlights the strengths 
and weaknesses of current research approaches to intrusion detection. The DARPA 
scientific study is the first of its kind to provide independent third party evaluation of 
intrusion detection tools against such a large corpus of data. 
The 1999 DARPA Off-Line Intrusion Detection Evaluation had four main 
objectives which were as follows (Haines et al. 2001):  
• Support developers of intrusion detection systems, by providing rich data sets 
for testing and experimentation. This data greatly facilitate algorithm 
development by providing examples of normal and attack traffic and eliminating 
the additional effort of traffic generation. 
• Evaluate intrusion detection approaches by analyzing the strengths and 
weakness of each. 
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• Analyze differences between alternate approaches and determine the reasons of 
false positives and false negatives. 
• Report summarized results of the evaluation and conclusions from the detailed 
analysis of each intrusion detection system in evaluation to DARPA to guide 
future efforts. 
MIT's Lincoln Laboratory set up a simulation environment for generating and 
distributing sniffed network data and audit data recorded on host machines. Software 
automata simulated hundreds of programmers, secretaries, managers, and other types of 
users running common UNIX application programs and some Windows NT programs. 
In addition, a small number of actual hosts appeared as if they were thousands of hosts 
with different IP addresses. Thus, hundreds of users on thousands of hosts were 
represented in the simulation. DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation testbed is 
given in Figure2.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Testbed. 
(Source: Haines et al. 2001) 
 
Because all the data were generated, the laboratory has a priori knowledge of 
which datum represents normal and which represents attack. Network traffic was 
generated to represent the following types of services: HTTP, SMTP, POP3, FTP, IRC, 
Telnet, X, SQL/telnet, DNS, finger, SNMP, and time. More than 200 instances of 58 
attack types were launched against victim UNIX and Windows NT hosts in three weeks 
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of training data and two weeks of test data. This corpus of data is the most 
comprehensive set known to be generated for the purpose of evaluating intrusion 
detection systems. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTRUSION DETECTION WITH NEURAL NETWORK 
 
This chapter provides the reason for building neural network based intrusion 
detection system. In addition, similar researches related to study, advantages and 
disadvantages of neural network based intrusion detection system are presented in this 
chapter. 
 
3.1. Motivation 
 
Although misuse and anomaly IDSs improve the security of an information 
system to a certain extent, both of them have limitations. 
Most current approaches to the process of misuse detection utilize some form of 
rule-based analysis. Rule-Based analysis relies on sets of predefined rules that are 
provided by an administrator, automatically created by the system, or both. These rules 
are used by the system to make conclusions about the security-related data from the 
intrusion detection system. Unfortunately, the detection ability of misuse systems is 
limited to the rule base that they posses. Hence misuse detectors require frequent 
updates to remain current. The required updates may be ignored or performed 
infrequently by the administrator and this may lead the system vulnerable to the attacks. 
In addition, writing a rule or signature of a new attack is not an easy task and can be 
time consuming. 
Another limitation of misuse detectors is that the misuse intrusion detection 
systems do not have generalization property and hence fail to detect unknown and even 
variations of known attacks, thus misuse IDSs generally have high false negative rates.  
Anomaly detectors also have limitations. For instance, although anomaly 
detectors can detect an attack accurately, they can not identify the specific type of attack 
occurring. However, the most significant problem of anomaly detection approach is the 
high false positive rates. Any deviation from the baseline will be flagged as intrusion; 
legitimate behavior outside the baseline will be labeled as intrusive. Another problem 
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arises if an attack occurs during the establishment of the baseline, then this intrusive 
behavior will be the part of the normal baseline. 
Instead of defining rules for each of the attack, which is a troublesome and time 
consuming process, neural networks can distinguish malicious and normal activity by 
learning correlations between training patterns. By applying neural networks to 
intrusion detection, the need for managing rules and signatures can come to end. In 
addition to that, neural networks posses the ability of generalization so that they can 
generalize from the previously observed behavior to similar future behavior. A neural 
network-based intrusion detection system could potentially address novelty detection 
problem in misuse detection systems and could lower the false positive rates of anomaly 
detectors to an acceptable level. 
Another reason to employ neural networks in intrusion detection is that, neural 
networks can cluster patterns which share similar features, thus the classification 
problem in anomaly detectors can be solved by neural networks. 
 
3.2. Earlier Work 
 
• One of the first attempts to employ neural networks to intrusion detection was 
performed by Ryan et al. in 1998 (Ryan et al.1998). An offline intrusion detection 
system, Neural Network Intrusion Detector (NNID), was trained and tested on a system 
with 10 users.  
The NNID anomaly intrusion detection system is based on identifying anomaly 
and legitimate usage based on the distribution of commands that user executed. For 
each user in the system, user profile was formed based on the commands executed by 
the user. System was implemented on UNIX environment and operating system logs 
were used to extract command usage. A set of 100 most common used commands in the 
logs and their frequencies were used to form input vectors of the neural network.  
The standard two-layer backpropagation architecture was chosen for the neural 
network. The input layer consisted of 100 units, representing the user vector; the hidden 
layer had 30 units and the output layer 10 units, one for each user. The network 
implemented in the PlaNet Neural Network simulator. The system was able to detect 
96% of attacks. The achieved false positive rate was 7%. 
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• As most computer violations are made possible by misusing of computer 
programs, host-based intrusion detection approaches are shifting from inspecting user 
behavior to inspecting program behavior. Rather than building user profiles, Ghosh et 
al. (Ghosh and Schwartzbard 1999) presented a host based intrusion detection system 
that focused on building program profiles and used these program profiles to recognize 
normal software behavior and malicious software behavior. In order to monitor process 
behavior, operating system was monitored to capture the system calls. The system was 
trained and tested on SUN platform and use Basic Security module (BSM) as source of 
data. Input data were extracted from BSM and a distance metric, which constituted 
input vectors of the neural network, was calculated for each data item and exemplar 
strings.  
The IDS presented was a single hidden layer MLP. The number of input nodes 
was equal to the number of exemplar strings. There was a single continuous node in the 
output layer. For each program, networks were trained with 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 
50, and 60 hidden nodes; the network, which gave the minimum false negative and false 
positive rates, was kept and others were discarded. Lucky Bucket algorithm is used to 
capture the temporal locality of anomalous events.  
Performance analysis was done with DARPA database. With a leak rate of 0.7 
the anomaly detection system achieved 77.3% detection rate and false positive rate of 
2.2%, whereas with the same leak rate misuse detection system achieved 90.9% 
detection rate and false positive rate of 18.7%. 
• Lee and Heinbuch (Lee and Heinbuch 2001) utilized an experimental intrusion 
detection system with a hierarchy of neural networks. Each of the neural networks in the 
hierarchy focused on different portions of nominal TCP behavior. Portions of these 
observed TCP behaviors are connection establishment, connection termination and port 
usage. System was trained to detect three kinds of attack, which are SYN flood, fast 
SYN port scan, and stealth SYN port scan. 
Backpropagation learning algorithm was used to train system. Input vectors to 
each of the neural networks were generated randomly. Number of input vectors 
generated was 4000-6000, which is claimed to be sufficient to train the system. 
• Lippmann and Cunnigham of MIT Lincoln Laboratory (Lippmann and 
Cunningham 2000) conducted a misuse detection model with neural networks, by 
searching attack specific keywords in the network traffic (Figure 3.1.). They used a 
MLP network to detect Unix-host attacks, and attacks to obtain root-privilege on a 
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server. The data that they presented to the neural network consisted of attack-specific 
keyword counts in network traffic. Two neural networks were used in the system, one 
for providing an attack probability and one for classifying attacks. 
 
Figure 3.1. Block diagram of enhanced intrusion detection system. 
 
A two-layer perceptron was designed with k input nodes, 2k hidden nodes and 2 
outputs (normal and attack) and the training algorithm used in the system was 
backpropagation. 
Sniffed network packets were first processed to construct transcripts containing 
all bytes transmitted to and from victim hosts during telnet sessions. These transcripts 
were then processed to get counts of each keyword. This count, which is the first output 
of the system, would be used as reference to provide a probability of an attack in the 
telnet session. In addition to providing an attack probability, this count is also used to 
classify known attacks, thus provide an attack name. 
Using neural network to weight keyword counts of a smaller set of 30 keywords 
lowers the false alarm rate to an acceptable and practical rate of roughly one false alarm 
per day with detection rate of %80. 
• In 2002 Jirapummin, Wattanapongsakorn and Kanthamanon (Jirapumin et al. 
2002) presented an alternative methodology for both visualizing intrusions by using 
self-organizing map and classifying intrusions by using Resilient Propagation Neural 
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Network (RPROP). Their research was focused on detection of TCP SYN flooding and 
port scanning attacks. 
Normal data set, Neptune attack (SYN flooding), Portsweep and Satan attacks 
(port scanning) were selected from KDD Cup 1999 data set. Total of 121.820 training 
patterns were divided equally into 8 sets. Each set is then clustered by a 1.234-unit 
SOM network. For RPROP, 3 layer network is utilized where there were 70 nodes in 
first hidden layer, 12 neurons in second hidden layer and 4 neurons in the output layer. 
The transfer functions for the first hidden layer, second hidden layer and the output 
layer of RPROP were tan-sigmoidal, log-sigmoidal and log-sigmoidal respectively. 
Two different datasets were used for testing purposes. First test set contained 
98.648 data, which was captured from the same network as the training data. Second 
test set contained 126.372 unseen normal and attack data from a different network. 
From the IDS simulation results, 90% detection rate with less than 5% false 
alarm rate was achieved in three selected attack programs. 
• Bivens et al. (Bivens et al. 2002) proposed a neural network model for a 
network-based intrusion detection system. Proposed IDS was an anomaly detection 
system and MLP network was used for detection. System read tcpdump data and sent to 
a preprocessing unit to keep the statistics of the network traffic. System used time-
window method, such that traffic intensities were analyzed at fixed time intervals. It 
was necessary to group similar traffic trends, and therefore preprocessed network traffic 
was sent to a clustering module, in which self-organizing maps were used for clustering 
purposes. Clustered traffic then sent to a normalization module for formatting, and 
output of the normalization module was driven to neural network. 
DARPA 1999 training dataset was used for testing the system. System was 
tested against denial of service attacks, distributed denial of service attacks, and port 
scans. Union of all attacks, system performed detection with 76% false positive and 
with no false negatives. 
• In another study accomplished by Ghosh et al. (Ghost et al. 1999), program 
behaviors were created from system calls and intrusion detection was performed from 
these profiles. An Elman network, which is similar to MLP with additional context 
nodes, was employed to perform classification of short sequences of BSM events. A 
leaky bucket algorithm, which provides some memory of recent events, was used to 
reduce false positive rate. Randomly generated data were used to train the neural 
network to identify normal an anomalous data. Performance of the system was tested 
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with data provided by the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation. With a leak rate of 
0.7, the Elman Network was able to detect 77.3% of all attacks without any false 
alarms. 
• In another study (Zhang et al. 2001), statistical analysis was used in conjunction 
with MLP networks. System is a distributed hierarchical application in the sense that 
system consists of hierarchy of Intrusion Detection Agents (IDAs) at multiple tiers 
where each tier corresponds to different network scope. IDAs are IDS components that 
monitor the activities of a host or a network. 
A diagram of an IDA is illustrated in Fig. 3.2., which consists of the following 
components: the probe, the event preprocessor, the statistical processor, the neural 
network classifier and the post processor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. A diagram of an IDA. 
 
Probe collects network traffic and abstracts it into statistical variables. Event 
preprocessor collects data from probes and other agents and formats it for the statistical 
analyzer. Statistical model compares the data to the previously compiled reference 
model which describes the normal state of the system. A “stimulus vector” is formed 
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and forwarded to the NN. Neural network analyzes the vector and decides whether it is 
anomalous or normal. Post processor generates reports for the agents at higher tiers or it 
may display the results through a user interface. 
Backpropagation , perceptron, perceptron-backpropagation hybrid, fuzzy ART 
MAP, radial-basis function networks with 2-8 hidden nodes were tested. The 
experimental testbed consisting of 11 workstations and 1 server was built by using 
OPNET network simulation software. UDP flooding attack was simulated within the 
testbed. 10.000 records of network traffic were collected, 6000 of which were used for 
training and the other 4000 records were used for testing. The system was trained for 
100 epochs. The results showed that backpropagation and perceptron-backpropagation 
hybrid networks outperformed perceptron, fuzzy ARTMAP and radial-basis function 
networks. 
• In another study (Rhodes et al. 2000), it is proposed to use of self-organizing 
neural networks to recognize anomalies in network data stream.  Unlike from other 
approaches which use self organizing maps to process entire state of a network or 
computer system to detect anomalies, proposed system breaks down the system by 
using collection of more specialized maps. A monitor stack (Figure 3.3.) was 
constructed and each neural network become kind of specialist to recognize normal 
behavior of a protocol and raise an alarm when a deviation from normal profile occurs. 
While each protocol attentive to different parts of network packets, different 
vectorization techniques were employed for each map.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. General schematic for the Network Monitor Stack. 
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In the experiment DNS protocol was inspected because of its relatively 
simplicity. Both of the test intrusions were buffer overflow attempt. Of the forty 
packets, first thirty were used to train map and the rest of them was used in testing. Of 
the seven packets transmitted to accomplish the bind4-9-5 exploit, four of the packets 
successfully detected. In addition, system successfully identified rotshb exploit. 
• Cannady (Cannady 1998) developed a network based neural network intrusion 
detection system where detection was achieved on the packet level. Nine of the packet 
characteristics of network data were selected and presented to the MLP network which 
has four fully connected layers. After 3 levels of preprocessing data was normalized, 
data fields were grouped and converted to a neural network readable format. In addition 
every packet was labeled whether the packet is an attack or not. 
Utilized neural network has nine input nodes and two output nodes and number 
of nodes in hidden layer was determined empirically. 10,000 packets, of which 
approximately 1000 were simulated attacks, were collected by RealSecure network 
monitor. Backpropagation algorithm was used to train neural network. 1000 randomly 
selected packets were used to test neural network and the remaining were used to train 
neural network. At the conclusion, root mean square error of 0.0582 was achieved for 
training data, while root mean square error of 0.069 was achieved for test data. 
A brief summary of earlier studies is given in 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Summary of Earlier Studies 
 
 Year Data Source NN Structure Test Results 
Ryan et al. 1998 Operating System Logs 2-Layer MLP 
7% False Positive 
4% False Negative 
Cannady 1998 
Network Packets 
Collected by 
Real Secure 
Network 
Monitor 
Software 
2-Layer MLP 
RMSE of 0.0582 for 
Training Data 
 
RMSE of 0.069 for 
Test Data. 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
Ghosh and 
Schwarztbard 1999 Sun’s BSM 2-Layer MLP 
Anomaly Detection: 
2.2% False Positive 
22.7% False 
Negative 
 
Misuse Detection: 
18.7% False Positive 
9.1% False Negative 
Ghosh et al. 1999 Sun’s BSM Elman Networks 
No False Positives 
22.7% False 
Negative 
 
Rhodes et al. 2000 Network Packets SOM 
Prototype could 
identify packets 
transmitted to 
accomplish bind4-9-
5 and rotshb exploit 
Lippmann 
and 
Cunnigham 
2000 Network Packets 2-Layer MLP 
One False Alarm per 
Day 
20% false Negative 
Zhang et al. 2001 
Network Packets 
Generated by 
OPNET 
Network 
Simulation 
Software 
Backpropagation 
 
Perceptron 
 
Perceptron-
Backpropagaiton 
Hybrid 
 
Fuzzy ART 
MAP 
 
Radial Basis 
Function 
Radial Basis 
Function and 
Backpropagation 
networks with 8 
nodes in hidden 
layer outperformed 
other neural 
networks. 
 
Backpropagation 
network having 8 
nodes in hidden 
layer had RMSE 
value less than 0.05 
and misclassification 
rate less than 00.2. 
 
Radial Basis 
Function network 
having 8 nodes in 
hidden layer had 
RMSE value less 
than 0.05 and 
misclassification 
rate less than 0.1. 
Lee and 
Heinbuch 2001 TCP packets 
Hierarchy of 
Neural 
Networks 
- 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
Jirapummin 
et al. 2002 
KDD Cup 1999 
Dataset 3-Layer RPROP 
5% False Positive 
10% False Negative 
Bivens et al. 2002 DARPA 1999 Dataset 
SOM for 
Clustering 
 
MLP for 
Detection 
76% False Positive 
No False Negatives 
 
3.3. Advantages of NN Based IDS 
 
The most important advantage of neural network based intrusion detection 
system is that, system will have generalization ability. From the training examples 
presented during training, neural networks can learn malicious activity flowing through 
the network and can generalize the observed novel activity from past activities used in 
training. 
Instead of following a set of rules specified by human experts, neural networks 
can learn input-output relationships from a given set of training patterns. This is the one 
major advantage of neural networks over rule-based systems. Thus, unlike misuse IDSs, 
neural network based IDSs do not need regular signature updates.  
Without any prior knowledge, neural networks can cluster data which share 
same features. By examining relationships between data patterns, neural networks can 
classify patterns successfully. 
Another advantage in the utilization of a neural network in the detection of 
misuse would be the flexibility that the neural network would provide. A neural 
network is capable of analyzing the data from the network, even if the data is 
incomplete or distorted.  
 
3.4. Disadvantages of NN Based IDS 
 
One of the most major problems with neural network is determining the number 
of hidden neurons and more generally determining the structure of the neural network as 
there is no mathematical method for selection of the neural network structure. Thus, 
various neural networks with different structures should be trained and the structure and 
number of the hidden nodes should be determined empirically by selecting the neural 
networks giving the best performance.  
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As the training set is the one of the major elements affecting the performance of 
the neural network, selecting the training set is a crucial issue. Neural network would 
not be trained, if the training examples are not appropriately selected or the number of 
training examples is insufficient. In addition, a complex structured neural network or 
huge number of training examples can result in long training periods. 
Although neural networks can be trained sufficiently, it is not always guaranteed 
that produced outputs will be perfect or even correct. Output produced by a neural 
network is just an approximation of the desired solution and there will be always certain 
error.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents in detail the research methodology used to build proposed 
network-based neural network intrusion detection system. In order to build a network-
based neural network intrusion detection system, certain steps should be taken (Figure 
4.1). First step to be taken is collecting data used to train and test neural networks. We 
used 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset to train and test neural 
networks. But number of attack instances is insufficient for training, so attack packets 
were generated in simulation environment. Second step is preprocessing the collected 
data, which is in binary tcpdump format, to a neural network readable format. Third step 
is determining the neural network structure, which is actually determining the number 
of hidden layers, number of hidden nodes in each layer, activation functions used in 
neural networks and training algorithm. Fourth step is training neural networks until a 
certain number of iterations or a certain RMSE value reached. Fifth and the final step is 
testing the neural network. Trained neural networks tested against training dataset in 
order to examine how well trained networks learned the data in the dataset. In addition 
to the training dataset, trained neural networks were tested against dataset which is not 
part of the training process. Aim of this test is to evaluate the generalization ability of 
the neural networks. 
 
Figure 4.1. Steps to be taken in order to build neural network based IDS. 
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training/testing 
dataset 
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 Neural network simulation was written with MATLAB 6.5. The reason for 
selecting MATLAB programming language is the ease of generating, training and 
testing the neural networks with its Neural Network Toolbox. 
 
4.1. Compose Training/Testing Data 
 
As effectiveness of the neural network mainly depends on the training data, 
collecting data for training and testing is a crucial issue. Data can be obtained by one of 
the following three ways: by using real traffic, by using sanitized traffic and by using 
simulated traffic (Mell et al. 2003). 
 The first option to obtain training/testing data is collecting actually real data and 
attacking an organization. Although packets would be real, it was unacceptable to attack 
an organization. In addition to that, privacy of the users in the organization would be 
violated as private e-mails, passwords and user identities would be released. 
In order to overcome security and privacy problems of using real traffic, 
sanitized traffic was proposed to be used by removing any sensitive data from the data 
stream. Then attack data can be inserted into the sanitized traffic. The advantage of this 
approach is that the data can be freely distributed. Nevertheless, the below explained 
problems arise when using this approach. First of all, most of the content of the 
background activity may be removed by the sanitization attempt. Next, it is still possible 
to release sensitive data since it is infeasible to verify large corpus of data. 
The third and the most common way to obtain data is to create a testbed network 
and generate background traffic on this network. In the testbed environment, 
background traffic is generated either by using complex traffic generators modeling 
actual network statistics or by using simpler commercial traffic generators creating 
small number of packets at a high rate. Advantage of this approach is that data can be 
freely distributed as it does not contain any sensitive information. Another advantage of 
this approach is that is guaranteed that generated traffic does not contain any unknown 
attacks as the background traffic is created by simulators. However difficulties exist 
when using this approach too. Firstly, it’s very costly and difficult to create a 
simulation. Next, in order to model various networks, different types of traffic is 
needed. 
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In order to avoid dealing with difficulties of all three approaches, DARPA 1999 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset was used for training/testing data. From the 
attack free first week data, days of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday were used for 
training and testing purposes. Dataset of Monday contains 1.272.249 TCP and 127.249 
UDP packets. Dataset of Tuesday contains 849.119 TCP and 50.338 UDP packets and 
dataset of Wednesday contains 649.852 TCP and 45.859 UDP packets. However attack 
instances in DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset are not sufficient to 
train the neural network, thus a simulation environment was formed and additional 
malicious traffic was aimed to obtain as explained below. 
Malicious traffic was created in the laboratory. Attacks, which form malicious 
traffic, were selected based on SANS top 10 vulnerabilities list. Simulation environment 
in laboratory contains one Linux Server, one Windows Server, two Windows 
workstations and two Linux workstations. By using network security scanners (e.g. 
Nessus, Shadow Security Scanner) and attack tools, one Linux and one Windows 
workstation were used to generate malicious network traffic in addition to the normal 
traffic. Simulation environment used to generate malicious traffic is given in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Simulation environment used to generate malicious traffic. 
 
Two distinct datasets were needed, one for training the neural network, and one 
for testing the neural network. For the training dataset, 9450 network packets were 
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selected from days of Monday and Wednesday from the attack free first week data of 
DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset. In addition to the attack free 
traffic, 971 attack packets were generated within the simulation environment and 
included to the training dataset. For the test dataset, 4233 network packets were selected 
from day of Tuesday from the first week data of DARPA dataset. 73 malicious network 
packets were generated and added to the test dataset. Summary of training and testing 
datasets is given in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. Summary of training and testing datasets. 
 
4.2. Preprocess Training/Testing Data 
 
All the data collected from simulation environment and DARPA dataset was in 
the binary tcpdump format. In order to preprocess and then present them to the neural 
network, obtained binary tcpdump files should be converted to a neural network 
readable format. To achieve this goal, an open source intrusion detection tool, Snort, 
was used.  
Snort (WEB_3 2004) is a lightweight network intrusion detection system, 
capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. Its 
author, Marty Roesch, originally designed Snort to be a personal tool which can be used 
in network traffic analysis and it was originally designed to decode binary tcpdump data 
into a human-readable form. Snort can be used as a sniffer, packet logger, or network 
intrusion detection system. In sniffer mode, Snort captures network packets flowing in a 
shared network and prints the captured network packets to the screen. In packet logger 
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mode, Snort captures packets in a similar sniffing fashion, but logs the captured data 
instead of printing it to the screen. In intrusion detection mode, Snort captures network 
packets like sniffer and logger mod, but applies pre-defined rules on all captured 
packets. If a packet matches a rule, then it is logged or an alert is generated. One of the 
most useful aspects of the Snort is that, it supports various relational databases like 
MySQL, Oracle or SQL Server. Captured packets can be stored in the supported 
databases. ER diagram of the database created by Snort is given in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. ER diagram of the database created by Snort. 
(Source: http://www.snort.org/docs/snortdb.png) 
 
Snort version 2.2 with SQL Server support was utilized and configuration file of 
the Snort was configured so that not only all the packets in binary tcpdump files are 
logged to the database but also packets containing attacks were labeled. After all 
network packets in tcpdump files were transferred to the database, stored data must be 
preprocessed before they are presented to the neural network. Three levels of 
preprocessing will be conducted: 
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In the first level of the preprocessing, for each collected packet stored in the 
database, seven characteristics of a packet will be retrieved. The seven elements were 
selected because they are typically present in network data packets and they provide a 
complete description of the information transmitted by the packet (Cannady 
1998).These characteristics are: 
Protocol ID: The protocol associated with event. (TCP=0, UDP=1) 
Source Port: The port number of the source. 
Destination Port: The port number of the destination. 
Source Address: The IP address of the source. 
Destination Address: The IP address of the destination. 
Raw Data Length: The length of the data in the packet. 
Raw Data: The data portion of the packet. 
 Second level of the preprocessing involves converting one of the alphanumeric 
seven packet characteristics (Raw Data) into a numerical representation. This can be 
easily achieved by executing DISTINCT SELECT queries for the characteristic, loading 
results sets to a table and assigning unique integers to records in the result set. 
Third level of preprocessing is selecting six of the original packet characteristics 
(Protocol ID, Source Port, Destination Port, Source Address, Destination Address, Raw 
Data Length) and the unique identifier of the remaining characteristic (Raw Data). In 
addition, an eight element (Attack), which was used to indicate whether the packet was 
an attack or not, was assigned to each record. A sample preprocessed input vector is 
shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. Sample preprocessed input vector. 
 
Protocol 
ID 
Source 
Port 
Destination 
Port 
Source 
Address 
Destination 
Address 
Data ID Raw Data  
Length 
Attack 
0 33694 161 2886758549 2886758500 1 2 1 
0 33695 162 2886758549 2886758500 2 4 0 
1 49345 69 3232235562 4294967295 1 2 0 
1 49345 69 3232235562 4294967295 2 4 1 
 
 Preprocessed training and test data stored in a newly created table and a small 
program written in MATLAB was executed to extract data from database as array of 
vectors, which in turn would be used to train and test the neural networks used in the 
experiments. 
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4.3 Neural Network Structure 
 
As there is no certain mathematical approach for obtaining the optimum number 
of hidden layers, two types of MLP networks, 3-layer MLP networks and 4-layer MLP 
networks, were employed in experiments. Generally neural networks with two hidden 
layers are capable of prediction and adding extra layers commonly yields similar results 
with two hidden layer networks, but their training periods are longer due to the more 
complex structures. Despite this fact, in addition to the 3-layer MLP networks 4-layer 
MLP networks were also utilized in experiments, in order to compare performances of 
3-layer and 4-layer MLPs. For each of these types, two separate neural network sets 
were generated, one of which was trained with backpropagation algorithm with 
momentum while the other set was trained with the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. 
Eventually, we generated two sets of 3-layer and two sets of 4-layer MLP networks.  
In addition to the MLP networks, four self-organizing maps were utilized in 
order to examine how well these networks can group the networks packets and whether 
the SOMs can be able to cluster similar attacks. 
Details of MLP and SOM network structures used in experiments are given in 
section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively. 
 
4.3.1. MLP Networks 
 
MLP networks used to make basic input-output mapping. MLP networks would 
be trained in such way that, they would produce value of 1 if the presented input vector 
is attack and 0 if the presented input vector is normal network packet. 
For all of the MLP networks, independent from the number of hidden layers, the 
number of input and output nodes is equal to the number of network inputs and desired 
outputs respectively. Therefore, input layer of all MLP networks contains seven nodes 
corresponding each network input while output layer contains only one node 
determining whether the presented input vector is an attack (with the value of 1) or not 
(with the value of 0). Hyperbolic tangent sigmoid activation function was used in all 
MLPs.  
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As there is no generic rule to find out the optimum number of hidden nodes 
needed, number of nodes in hidden layers is determined empirically for both 3-layer and 
4-layer MLP networks. 
For the set of 3-layer MLP networks, 25 different MLPs, which were formed by 
the combination of hidden layers with 5, 10, 15 20, 25 nodes, were generated. When a 
neural network is formed, weights between neurons are initialized randomly. As initial 
weight can significantly affect the performance of the neural network, each MLP was 
re-initialized ten times in order to avoid poor performance due to bad initial weights. 
Eventually, two set of 3-layer MLPs, each containing 250 MLP networks, were 
generated. One set was trained with backpropagation algorithm and the other set was 
trained with Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. 
For the set of 4-layer MLP networks, 125 different MLPs, which were formed 
by the combination of hidden layers with 5, 10, 15 20, 25 nodes, were generated. 
Because of the long training periods, re-initialization process was not conducted. Like 
3-layer MLPs, two sets were generated, one of which was trained with backpropagation 
algorithm and the other set was trained with Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. 
After the training process, all MLPs were tested against a test dataset, which is 
not part of the training data set and MLP networks which gave the minimum false 
positive and false negative rates was kept. 
 
4.3.2. Self-Organizing Maps 
 
 SOMs are used to classify data, which share similar characteristics. As 
mentioned in chapter two, only input vectors are used in training phase of the SOMs 
and SOMs are able to cluster similar data without giving them correct answers. In our 
research, we proposed to use SOMs in order to cluster normal and attack packets. 
 In our experiments we utilized four SOMs having grid architecture with 8x8 
10x10, 15x15, 20x20 nodes in the feature layer. 
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4.4. Training the Neural Networks 
 
 In the training phase we have both input patterns and desired outputs related to 
each input vector. Aim of the training in MLP networks is minimizing output produced 
by the neural network and the desired output. In order to achieve this goal, weights are 
updated by carrying out certain steps (which is called as the training algorithm). 
When using a supervised learning algorithm (e.g. backpropagation , Levenberg-
Marquardt), training process is usually terminated when the RMSE is reduced to an 
acceptable level. There is no standard for the RMSE, but usually the lower it is, the 
better the classification rate is. But a too low RMSE may result in over training of the 
neural network. This means that neural network loose generalization ability, hence it 
will just detect attacks that are exactly identical to the training data. 
Another criterion for training termination is the number of iterations. When a 
certain number of iterations were reached, the training was stopped, even if the desired 
RMSE was not reached. 
250 3-layer and 125 4-layer MLP networks were trained with gradient descent 
backpropagation algorithm with a momentum rate of 0.5. Maximum number of epochs 
is 1000 and desired RMS was 0.0001.  
250 3-layer and 125 4-layer MLP networks were trained with Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm. Maximum number of epochs is 50 and desired RMSE was 
0.0001.  
Training of the SOMS is different from MLP networks, as in the training phase 
of the SOMs desired outputs corresponding to the input vectors are not needed. But 
after the training process every node in the feature map should be labeled. 
Training data set contains 10.421 input patterns, of which 971 are attacks. 
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Figure 4.5. A sample training session where performance goal was met in 38 epochs. 
 
4.5. Testing the Neural Networks 
 
After the training is completed, the weights of the neural networks are frozen 
and performance of the neural networks evaluated. Testing the neural networks involves 
two steps, which are verification step and recall (or generalization) step. 
In verification step, neural networks are tested against the data which are used in 
training. Aim of the verification step is to test how well trained neural networks learned 
the training patterns in the training dataset. If a neural network was trained successfully, 
outputs produced by the neural network would be similar to the actual outputs. 
In recall or generalization step, testing is conducted with data which not used in 
training. Aim of the generalization step is to measure generalization ability of the 
trained network Recall data set contains 4306 input pattern, of which 73 are attacks. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 This chapter presents the experimental results obtained by using the neural 
network based intrusion detection system, of which the methodology was already 
explained in the previous chapter. After the training process was completed, testing was 
conducted basically in two steps. In the first step, five sets of trained neural networks 
(3-layer backpropagation networks, 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks, 4-layer 
backpropagation networks, 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks and self-organizing 
maps) were tested against the training dataset, in order to examine how well neural 
networks ‘learned’ the training dataset after the training process. In the second step of 
the testing, trained neural networks were tested against a dataset, which is not a part of 
the training set, in order to examine generalization performance of the trained networks. 
In both testing steps performance of the neural networks was evaluated by examining 
the number of false positives and false negatives that they generated. 
 
5.1. Verification Step 
 
 First step of the testing is the verification, where trained neural networks were 
tested against the training dataset. The aim of this step is to check if the neural networks 
were trained correctly. If the neural networks were trained correctly, neither false 
negatives nor false positives should be observed, at least false negative and false 
positive rates should be at an acceptable level. Training dataset contains 9450 normal 
and 971 attack instances. 
 
5.1.1. 3-Layer Backpropagation Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated by each of the 3-layer backpropagation 
network after the verification step is given in Figure. 5.1. 10 neural networks were 
generated for each of the neural network architecture. Reason for generating 10 neural 
 47 
networks for each of the neural network architecture is to avoid poor performances due 
to the bad initialization of the neural network weights. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Number of false positives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 From the Figure 5.1, it can be said that 3-layer backpropagation networks 
learned the normal network packets within the training dataset quite fairly, as 78 of 250 
3-layer backpropagation networks generated no false positives, whereas the number of 
3-layer backpropagation networks generating less than 10 false positives is 91. There 
are approximately 9800 normal network packets in the training dataset, and most of the 
3-layer backpropagation networks recognized the normal network packets in the 
training dataset. 
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 It can be also seen from Figure 5.1 that, initial values of the weights can 
significantly affect performance of the neural network, as neural networks that have the 
same architecture but different initial weight values show different performances. 
 Another point which should be mentioned is that, increasing number of hidden 
nodes would not improve the performance. For instance, most of the neural networks 
having 7-5-5-1 architecture show better performances than the most of the neural 
networks having 7-15 -25-1 architecture. 
 Another criterion used to determine the performance of the neural networks is 
the number of false negatives, which is the number of the missed attacks. Number of the 
false negatives encountered by the 3-layer backpropagation networks is given in Figure 
5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Number of false negatives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
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 Number of the false negatives encountered by the 3-layer backpropagation 
networks is surprising. Although neural networks learned the normal packets in the 
training dataset quite fairly, they failed to distinguish attack packets in the training 
dataset. There are 971 attack instances in the training dataset, and the neural network 
that showed best performance by mean of false negatives is the one having 7-15-25-1 
architecture and an identity of 6 with 176 false negatives.  
 
5.1.2. 3-Layer Levenberg-Marquardt Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated by each of the 3-layer Levenberg-
Marquardt network after the verification step is given in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Number of false positives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
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 After examining Figure 5.3, it can be said that with some exceptions 3-layer 
Levenberg-Marquardt networks learned the normal packets in the training dataset. 
Number of 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks, which generated no false positives, 
is 92. In addition, 111 of 250 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks generated less 
than 10 false positives. Except for the neural networks having 5 hidden nodes in the first 
hidden layer, all of the other neural networks successfully learned the normal packets in 
the training dataset. In addition, it was observed that, some networks (for instance 
neural network having 7-20-10-1 architecture and an identity of 5) showed poor 
performances, probably due to the bad initialization of the weights. Neural networks 
having 25 hidden nodes in the first hidden layer showed the best performances among 
the other neural networks having different architecture. 
 Number of the false negatives encountered by the 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks is given in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Number of false negatives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
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 False negative results obtained by the 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks 
are promising. Unlike from the 3-layer backpropagation networks, most of the 3-layer 
Levenberg-Marquardt networks successfully distinguished attacks instances in the 
training dataset. 98 of 250 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks generated no false 
negatives. Beyond some instances of the other network architectures, nearly all neural 
networks having 20 or 25 hidden nodes in the first hidden layer produced no false 
negatives. 92 of 250 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks generated less than 10 
false negatives.  
 
5.1.3. 4-Layer Backpropagation Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated by each of the 4-layer backpropagation 
network after the verification step is given in Figure 5.5. As managing whole neural 
networks would be a troublesome task and training periods would take long, 4-layer 
backpropagation networks were not re-initialized. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Number of false positives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
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 From Figure 5.5, it can be said that 4-layer backpropagation networks can fairly 
distinguish normal network packets in the training dataset. 32 of 125 4-layer 
backpropagation networks successfully identified normal packets in the training dataset 
without generating any false positives. Additionally, 74 of 125 4-layer Levenberg-
Marquardt networks generated less than 10 false positives. 
 Number of false positives encountered after testing 4-layer backpropagation 
networks against the training dataset is given in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Number of false negatives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 It is observed that, like 3-layer backpropagation networks, 4-layer 
backpropagation networks failed to learn the attack instances in the training dataset. 
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Number of false negatives is relatively high with respect to the 971 attack instances in 
the training dataset. Neural network with architecture of 7-25-05-25-1 showed the best 
performance with 86 false negatives. 
 
5.1.4. 4-Layer Levenberg-Marquardt Neural Networks 
 
 Numbers of false positives generated by 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks 
after presenting training dataset is given in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Number of false positives for 4-Layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
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 It can be seen from the Figure 5.7, most of the 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks could successfully recognize normal attack packets in the training dataset. 79 
of 125 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks successfully identified normal packets in 
the training dataset without generating any false positive. 31 of 125 4-layer Levenberg-
Marquardt networks generated less than 10 false negatives. However, 7-5-5-5-1 and 7-
25-20-15-1 networks failed to recognize normal packets in the training dataset and 
flagged all normal packets as attack. 
 Number of false negatives generated by 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks 
is given in Figure 5.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Number of false negatives for 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
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 All of the 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks but neural networks of 7-5-
10-10-1, 7-5-20-25-1, 7-10-5-20-1, 7-15-5-5-1, 7-15-5-25-1, 7-25-5-5-1 could learn the 
attack packets in the training dataset. 60 of 125 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks 
generated no false negatives when they were tested against the training dataset. 46 of 
125 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks generated less than 10 false negatives. 
 
5.1.5. SOMs 
 
 In our study, four types of SOMs with 8x8, 10x10, 15x15 and 20x20 nodes in 
the feature layer were trained. The aim of using SOMs in this research is to train SOMs 
such that every node in the feature layer would represent an attack type. In verification 
step, every training example is presented to the SOMs and which training example 
activates which output node in the feature map was inspected. By doing so every output 
node in the feature map was labeled.  
 Although our aim for using SOMs in the field of intrusion detection is to classify 
attacks, at the end of the verification step, it is observed that all of the four SOMs failed 
to classify attack instances in the training dataset, but instead it was seen that similar 
attacks were grouped together. As a result, SOMs were used to distinguish normal and 
attack packets instead of classifying attacks. 
 For the 8x8 SOM, attacks in the training dataset were distributed among the 
output nodes of 35, 42 56 57 58 64. 8x8 SOM gave no false negatives in verification 
step, but 9450 of normal packets, 3979 of them were labeled incorrectly as attack. 
 For the 10x10 SOM, attacks in the training dataset were distributed among the 
output nodes of 9, 10, 55, 65, 66, 67, 74 and 97. 10x10 SOM gave also no false 
negatives, but 9450 of normal packets, 1127 of them were labeled incorrectly as attack. 
 For the 15x15 SOM, attacks in the training dataset were distributed among the 
output nodes of 35, 78, 95, 96, 110, 11, 179, 180, 194, 209 and 225. 15x15 SOM gave 
no false negatives, but 1768 of the normal packets were labeled incorrectly as attack. 
 For the 20x20 SOM, attacks in the training dataset were distributed among the 
output nodes of 2, 91, 92, 108, 109, 110, 11, 130, 131, 149, 151, 361, 362, 363 and 381. 
20x20 SOM gave also no false negatives, but 750 of the normal packets were labeled 
incorrectly as attack. 
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5.2. Generalization Step 
 
 In the generalization step trained networks were tested against a dataset, which 
is not part of the training dataset. Aim of this step is to see how well trained networks 
would distinguish unknown normal and attack packets in the test dataset. In this step 
generalization ability of the trained networks would be evaluated, as trained network 
would decide whether an unknown packet is an attack or not by generalizing known 
packets learned in training process. There are 4233 normal and 73 attack packets in the 
test dataset. 
 
5.2.1. 3-Layer Backpropagation Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated by each of the 3-layer backpropagation 
network after the verification step is given in Figure 5.9. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Number of false positives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
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 It is observed from the Figure 5.9 that, of the 250 trained 3-layer 
backpropagation networks, 181 of them could successfully generalize test dataset from 
the training dataset. Rest of the 69 3-layer backpropagation networks were not trained 
correctly and they flagged all normal network packets as attack. 
 Number of the false negatives encountered by the 3-layer backpropagation 
networks is given in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Number of false negatives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 It can be seen from the Figure 5.10, most of the 3-layer backpropagation failed 
to catch attacks in the test dataset. Only a few numbers of 3-layer backpropagation 
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networks, namely, 1st and 7th networks of 7-5-10-1 architecture, 5th network of the 7-15-
15-1 architecture, 10th network of the 7-15-20-1 architecture, 10th network of the 7-15-
25-1 architecture,7th network of the 7-20-5-1 architecture, 10th network of the 7-20-25-1 
architecture and 10th network of the 7-25-20-1 architecture, could successfully identify 
attacks in the test dataset with no false negatives. 
 
5.2.2. 3-Layer Levenberg-Marquardt Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated by each of the 3-layer Levenberg-
Marquardt network after the verification step is given in Figure 5.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Number of false positives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 59 
 
 119 of the 250 3-alyer Levenberg-Marquardt networks could successfully 
identify normal packets in the test dataset without giving any false positives. The rest of 
the 131 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks failed to recognize normal packets in 
the test dataset, as they labeled all normal packets as attack. 
 Number of the false negatives encountered by the 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks is given in Figure 5.12. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Number of false negatives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 It can be seen from Figure 5.12, 41 of 250 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks, which have different architectures, successfully recognized the attack patterns 
in the test dataset without generating any false negatives.  
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5.2.3. 4-Layer Backpropagation Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated when test dataset was presented to the 4-
layer backpropagation networks is given in Figure 5.13. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13. Number of false positives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 Results show us that, 98 of 250 4-layer backpropagation networks could 
successfully identify normal packets in the dataset without giving any false positives. 
But performances of the rest of 152 4-layer backpropagation networks are poor, as all of 
them flagged normal packets in the test dataset as attack. 
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 Number of false negatives generated when test dataset presented to the 4-layer 
backpropagation networks is given in Figure 5.14. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Number of false negatives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 Unlike from the performance in false positive rates, most of the 4-layer 
backpropagation networks showed poor performances in the context of number of false 
negatives. Only five 4-layer backpropagation networks, namely neural networks having 
the architectures of 7-10-20-05-1, 7-15-05-15-1, 7-15-25-05-1, 7-20-15-15-1, 7-25-05-
25-1, could successfully detect all attacks in the test dataset. 
 
5.2.4. 4-Layer Levenberg-Marquardt Neural Networks 
 
 Number of false positives generated when test dataset is presented to the 4-layer 
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm is given in Figure 5.15.  
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Figure 5.15. Number of false positives for 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 Examination of the Figure 5.15 showed us that, 60 of 250 networks could 
successfully identify normal packets in the test dataset without generating any false 
positives. Rest of the 165 networks labeled all normal packets in the test dataset as 
attack. 
 Number of false negatives encountered by 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks when test dataset is presented is given in Figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16. Number of false negatives for 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 Results of the experiments showed us that, 16 of 125 4-layer Levenberg-
Marquardt networks could successfully distinguish attack packets in the test dataset 
without giving any false negatives. 
 
5.2.5. SOMs 
 
 In the generalization step, in the context of false negatives all of the four SOMs 
performed well, as none of them generated false negatives. Number of false positives 
generated among 4233 normal packets, SOMs having 8x8, 10x10, 15x15, 20x20 nodes 
in feature layer generated 1845, 819, 830 and 332 false positives respectively.  
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5.3. Analysis 
 
 Although many trained neural networks could successfully distinguish attack 
and normal packets in the either training dataset or test dataset, number of trained 
networks, which could successfully distinguish normal and attack packets in both 
training and test dataset, is few. 
 None of the trained 3-layer and 4-layer backpropagation networks could 
successfully identify normal and attack instances in both of the training dataset and test 
dataset. Although some of them successfully identify attacks and normal packets in 
training dataset and some of them successfully identify attack and normal packets in the 
test dataset set, none of them achieved to identify all attack and normal packets in both 
of the training and test dataset. 
 Similar results were obtained for 3-layer and 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks. Like backpropagation networks, many of the Levenberg-Marquardt networks 
could successfully distinguish attack and normal packets either in training dataset or in 
test dataset. However, number of Levenberg-Marquardt networks, which could 
successfully distinguish attack and normal packets in both training and test dataset, is 
too low. Among 250 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks, number of neural 
networks, which could successfully identify all attacks in both datasets, is four. These 
networks are: 6th network of the 7-10-25-1 architecture, 5th network of the 7-15-25-1 
architecture, 9th network of the 7-20-25-1 architecture, 5th network of the 7-20-20-1 
architecture. There are five 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks, which could 
successfully distinguish attack and normal packets both in training dataset and test 
dataset. These networks are neural networks having the architectures of 7-15-15-5-1, 7-
15-10-20-1, 7-25-20-20-1, 7-25-20-25-1 and 7-20-25-15-1. 
 Results of the SOMs’ experiments showed us that, although all SOMs failed to 
classify attack types in the training dataset, they successfully identified attacks from 
normal packets in training and test datasets. It was observed that, attacks in the datasets 
were distributed among few output nodes. All of the SOMs could successfully identify 
attacks without generating any false negatives in both of the two test steps. The SOM 
having 20x20 nodes in feature map outperformed other SOMs having different 
architectures with generating 750 and 332 false positives when tested against training 
and test dataset respectively. 
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5.4. Discussion 
 
 After the examination of the experimental results, it is observed that many 
networks failed to distinguish attack and normal packets in training dataset, which is in 
turn resulted in high false positive and false negative rates. This is due to the fact that, 
these networks could not achieve to reach desired error rate of 0.0001 in given iterations 
(1000 for backpropagation algorithm and 50 for Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm), 
hence they failed to learn normal and/or attack packets in the training datasets. As these 
networks could not be trained correctly, they also failed to distinguish normal and attack 
packets in the test dataset. 
 It is also observed that, although some neural networks were trained correctly 
and they could successfully recognize normal and attack packets in the training dataset, 
they failed to distinguish attack and/or normal packets in the test dataset. This is due to 
the fact that, these networks were over-trained; hence they could not generalize packets 
in test dataset from learned packets in training dataset. 
 It is seen that, assignment of initial weight values can significantly affect the 
performance of the neural networks, as neural networks having same architectures 
showed different performances due to the different initial weight values. 
 It is worth to mention that, we found out increasing the number of hidden layers 
may not cause an increase in performance, as four 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt 
networks achieved to distinguish attack and normal packets in both training and test 
dataset. But we experienced that, training periods of the 4-layer networks are longer 
than the 3-layer networks due to their more complex structures. 
 None of the backpropagation networks could successfully identify attacks and/or 
normal packets in both tests, while nine Levenberg-Marquardt networks could 
successfully distinguishes normal and attack packets in both tests. This is due to the fact 
that, Levenberg-Marquardt training algorithm is faster than backpropagation algorithm 
and Levenberg-Marquardt networks were trained more accurately. 
 All trained SOMs could successfully identify attack instances in training and test 
dataset. It was observed that, increasing number of nodes in feature map improves false 
positive rates. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study a network-based neural network intrusion detection system was 
presented. The main problem with current IDSs is that they produce many false alarms. 
In addition to that, writing rules or signatures is not an easy task and can be time 
consuming. The purpose of this study was to develop a neural network based intrusion 
detection system in order to decrease false positive and false negative rates as neural 
networks can generalize unknown network packets from known ones. Additionally, 
with using neural networks writing rules for every attack and regular updating of the 
attack signatures can be avoided. 
Two training algorithms; backpropagation and Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, 
were used in the training of neural networks. For each of these training algorithms a 3-
layer and a 4-layer MLP network sets were generated. As there is no rule for 
determining the optimum number of nodes in hidden layer, variety of MLP networks, 
each of which has different number of nodes in hidden layer(s), were generated and the 
MLP networks, which performed best in testing step, was kept and the others were 
discarded. 
Tests were conducted in two steps. In the first step trained networks were tested 
against the training dataset to see how well trained MLP networks learned the training 
set. In the second step of the testing, trained MLP networks tested against a dataset, 
which is not part of the training dataset, to see generalization ability of the trained 
networks. 
Analysis of the experimental results show us that, both 3-layer and 4-layer 
backpropagation networks failed to distinguish normal and attack packets either in 
training dataset or in test dataset. This is due to the fact that, some of the 
backpropagation networks could not be trained correctly and showed poor performances 
in the test against training dataset whereas some of them were over-trained, hence could 
not generalize unknown packets from known ones and showed poor performances in the 
test against test dataset. We also observed that, a few number of MLP networks of 3-
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layer and 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks achieved to identify normal and attack 
packets in training and test dataset. 
SOMs failed to classify attacks in the experiments, but they performed well 
when identified attack instances in training and test datasets. 
 Nine of the trained Levenberg-Marquardt networks gave no false positives and 
false negatives and outperformed similar studies which were summarized in Table 3.1. 
In study, it is observed that, appropriately trained neural networks can learn 
intrusive and non-intrusive network packets and can distinguish normal and attack 
packets in an unseen dataset. 
As future work, different characteristics of the network packet may be selected 
in addition to the seven characteristics. Additionally, new attacks may be added to the 
training dataset. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF THE SELECTED VULNERABILITIES 
 
 Vulnerabilities selected among top 10 vulnerabilities declared by SANS Institute 
are given below. Additionally description of the vulnerability, which is taken from 
Internet site (WEB_4 2005) of common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) , tool 
used to exploit the vulnerability and the Snort signature identity of the generated attack 
are also given below. Since more than one attack may be generated to exploit 
vulnerability, there may be two or more Snort signature identities associated with each 
attack generated. 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0002 
Description Buffer overflow in NFS mountd gives root access to remote 
attackers, mostly in Linux systems 
Snort Signature ID 579 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0003 
Description Execute commands as root via buffer overflow in Tooltalk database server (rpc.ttdbserverd). 
Snort Signature ID 558 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0021 
Description Arbitrary command execution via buffer overflow in Count.cgi (wwwcount) cgi-bin program. 
Snort Signature ID 1149 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0066 
Description 
The CGI 'AnyForm2' is installed. Old versions of this CGI 
have a well known security flaw that lets anyone execute 
arbitrary commands with the privileges of the http daemon. 
Snort Signature ID 892 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0067 
Description CGI phf program allows remote command execution through 
shell metacharacters. 
Snort Signature ID 1762 
Tool used Nessus 
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CVE Name CVE-1999-0070 
Description test-cgi program allows an attacker to list files on the server. 
Snort Signature ID 835 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0146 
Description The campas CGI program provided with some NCSA web 
servers allows an attacker to read arbitrary files. 
Snort Signature ID 847 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0172 
Description FormMail CGI program allows remote execution of 
commands. 
Snort Signature ID 884 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0174 
Description The view-source CGI program allows remote attackers to 
read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) attack. 
Snort Signature ID 849, 1482 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0191 
Description 
The CGI /scripts/tools/newdsn.exe is present. This CGI 
allows any attacker to create files anywhere on your system if 
your NTFS permissions are not tight enough, and can be used 
to overwrite DSNs of existing databases. 
Snort Signature ID 1024 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0208 
Description rpc.ypupdated (NIS) allows remote users to execute arbitrary 
commands. 
Snort Signature ID 661 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0237 
Description 
guestbook.pl and guestbook.cgi have a well known security 
flaw that lets anyone execute arbitrary commands with the 
privileges of the http daemon. 
Snort Signature ID 1597, 1140 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0260 
Description The jj CGI program allows command execution via shell 
metacharacters. 
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Snort Signature ID 1174 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0262 
Description faxsurvey CGI script on Linux allows remote command 
execution via shell metacharacters. 
Snort Signature ID 857 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0264  
Description 
The 'htmlscript' cgi is installed. This CGI has well known 
security flaw that lets anyone read arbitrary files with the 
privileges of the http daemon. 
Snort Signature ID 826 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0266 
Description The info2www CGI script allows remote file access or remote 
command execution. 
Snort Signature ID 827 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-0278  
Description 
It is possible to get the source code of the remote ASP scripts 
by appending ::$DATA at the end of the request (like GET 
/default.asp::$DATA). 
Snort Signature ID 975 
Tool used  Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-1999-0509 
Description 
Perl, sh, csh, or other shell interpreters are installed in the cgi-
bin directory on a WWW site, which allows remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary commands. 
Snort Signature ID 832, 862, 865, 868, 872, 877, 885, 1309, 1648, 2649 
Tool used Nessus, Nikto 
 
CVE Name CAN-1999-0517 
Description An SNMP community name is the default (e.g. public), null, 
or missing. 
Snort Signature ID 1411, 1893 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-1999-0736 
Description The showcode.asp sample file in IIS and Site Server allows 
remote attackers to read arbitrary files. 
Snort Signature ID 1037 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-1999-1011 
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Description 
The Remote Data Service (RDS) DataFactory component of 
Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) in IIS 3.x and 
4.x exposes unsafe methods, which allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary commands. 
Snort Signature ID 1023 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-1999-1376 
Description 
There might be a buffer overflow in the remote 
fpcount.exe cgi. An attacker may use it to execute arbitrary 
code on this host. 
Snort Signature ID 1012, 1013 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2000-0208 
Description 
The htdig (ht://Dig) CGI program htsearch allows remote 
attackers to read arbitrary files by enclosing the file name 
with backticks ( )` in parameters to htsearch. 
Snort Signature ID 1600, 1601, 1602 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2000-0287 
Description 
The BizDB CGI script bizdb-search.cgi allows remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell 
metacharacters in the dbname parameter. 
Snort Signature ID 1535 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2000-0778 
Description 
This host is running the Microsoft IIS web server. This web 
server contains a configuration flaw that allows the retrieval 
of the global.asa file. This file may contain sensitive 
information such as database passwords, internal addresses, 
and web application configuration options. This vulnerability 
may be caused by a missing ISAPI map of the .asa extension 
to asp.dll. 
Snort Signature ID 1016 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-0832 
Description Htgrep CGI program allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by specifying the full pathname in the hdr parameter. 
Snort Signature ID 1207, 1615 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1081 
Description 
The xp_displayparamstmt function in SQL Server and 
Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not 
properly restrict the length of a buffer before calling the 
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srv_paraminfo function in the SQL Server API for Extended 
Stored Procedures (XP), which allows an attacker to cause a 
denial of service or execute arbitrary commands, aka the 
"Extended Stored Procedure Parameter Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 974 
Tool used xp_displayparamstmt.exe 
 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1082 
Description 
The xp_enumresultset function in SQL Server and Microsoft 
SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly 
restrict the length of a buffer before calling the srv_paraminfo 
function in the SQL Server API for Extended Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows an attacker to cause a denial 
of service or execute arbitrary commands, aka the "Extended 
Stored Procedure Parameter Parsing" vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 780 
Tool used xp_enumresultset .exe 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1083 
Description 
The xp_showcolv function in SQL Server and Microsoft SQL 
Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly restrict the 
length of a buffer before calling the srv_paraminfo function in 
the SQL Server API for Extended Stored Procedures (XP), 
which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or 
execute arbitrary commands, aka the "Extended Stored 
Procedure Parameter Parsing" vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 705 
Tool used xp_showcolv.exe 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1084 
Description 
The xp_updatecolvbm function in SQL Server and Microsoft 
SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly 
restrict the length of a buffer before calling the srv_paraminfo 
function in the SQL Server API for Extended Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows an attacker to cause a denial 
of service or execute arbitrary commands, aka the "Extended 
Stored Procedure Parameter Parsing" vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 701 
Tool used xp_updatecolvbm.exe 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1085 
Description 
The xp_peekqueue function in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 
and SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly 
restrict the length of a buffer before calling the srv_paraminfo 
function in the SQL Server API for Extended Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows an attacker to cause a denial 
of service or execute arbitrary commands, aka the "Extended 
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Stored Procedure Parameter Parsing" vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 760 
Tool used xp_peekqueue.sql / xp_peekqueue .exe 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1086 
Description 
The xp_printstatements function in Microsoft SQL Server 
2000 and SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not 
properly restrict the length of a buffer before calling the 
srv_paraminfo function in the SQL Server API for Extended 
Stored Procedures (XP), which allows an attacker to cause a 
denial of service or execute arbitrary commands, aka the 
"Extended Stored Procedure Parameter Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 699 
Tool used xp_printstatements .exe 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1087 
Description 
The xp_proxiedmetadata function in Microsoft SQL Server 
2000 and SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not 
properly restrict the length of a buffer before calling the 
srv_paraminfo function in the SQL Server API for Extended 
Stored Procedures (XP), which allows an attacker to cause a 
denial of service or execute arbitrary commands, aka the 
"Extended Stored Procedure Parameter Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
Snort Signature ID 707 
Tool used xp_proxiedmetadata.exe 
 
CVE Name CAN-2000-1209 
Description 
The "sa" account is installed with a default null password on 
(1) Microsoft SQL Server 2000, (2) SQL Server 7.0, and (3) 
Data Engine (MSDE) 1.0, including third party packages that 
use these products such as (4) Tumbleweed Secure Mail 
(MMS) (5) Compaq Insight Manager, and (6) Visio 2000, 
which allows remote attackers to gain privileges, as exploited 
by worms such as Voyager Alpha Force and Spida. 
Snort Signature ID 688 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2001-0236 
Description 
Buffer overflow in Solaris snmpXdmid SNMP to DMI 
mapper daemon allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary 
commands via a long "indication" event. 
Snort Signature ID 1279 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2001-0241 
Description Buffer overflow in Internet Printing ISAPI extension in Windows 2000 allows remote attackers to gain root privileges 
 76 
via a long print request that is passed to the extension through 
IIS 5.0. 
Snort Signature ID 971 
Tool used CVE-2001-0241.pl 
 
CVE Name CVE-2001-0333 
Description 
When IIS receives a user request to run a script, it renders the 
request in a decoded canonical form, then performs security 
checks on the decoded request. A vulnerability results 
because a second, superfluous decoding pass is performed 
after the initial security checks are completed. Thus, a 
specially crafted request could allow an attacker to execute 
arbitrary commands on the IIS Server. 
Snort Signature ID 970 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2001-0717 
Description 
Format string vulnerability in ToolTalk database server 
rpc.ttdbserverd allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary 
commands via format string specifiers that are passed to the 
syslog function. 
Snort Signature ID 588 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2001-0779 
Description 
Buffer overflow in rpc.yppasswdd (yppasswd server) in 
Solaris 2.6, 7 and 8 allows remote attackers to gain root 
access via a long username. 
Snort Signature ID 2025 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0012 
Description 
Vulnerabilities in a large number of SNMP implementations 
allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or gain 
privileges via SNMPv1 trap handling, as demonstrated by the 
PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite. NOTE: It is highly likely 
that this candidate will be SPLIT into multiple candidates, 
one or more for each vendor. This and other SNMP-related 
candidates will be updated when more accurate information is 
available. 
Snort Signature ID 1412, 1413, 1417, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1421 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2002-0033 
Description 
Heap-based buffer overflow in cfsd_calloc function of Solaris 
cachefsd allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via 
a request with a long directory and cache name. 
Snort Signature ID 1746 
Tool used Nessus 
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CVE Name CAN-2002-0071 
Description 
Buffer overflow in the ism.dll ISAPI extension that 
implements HTR scripting in Internet Information Server 
(IIS) 4.0 and 5.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service 
or execute arbitrary code via HTR requests with long variable 
names. 
Snort Signature ID 1618, 1807 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0073 
Description 
The FTP service in Internet Information Server (IIS) 4.0, 5.0 
and 5.1 allows attackers who have established an FTP session 
to cause a denial of service via a specially crafted status 
request containing glob characters. 
Snort Signature ID 1777 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0079 
Description 
Buffer overflow in the chunked encoding transfer mechanism 
in Internet Information Server (IIS) 4.0 and 5.0 Active Server 
Pages allows attackers to cause a denial of service or execute 
arbitrary code. 
Snort Signature ID 1618, 1807 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0364 
Description 
Buffer overflow in the chunked encoding transfer mechanism 
in IIS 4.0 and 5.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code 
via the processing of HTR request sessions, aka "Heap 
Overrun in HTR Chunked Encoding Could Enable Web 
Server Compromise". 
Snort Signature ID 1806 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CVE-2002-0392 
Description 
Apache 1.3 through 1.3.24, and Apache 2.0 through 2.0.36, 
allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and 
possibly execute arbitrary code via a chunk-encoded HTTP 
request that causes Apache to use an incorrect size. 
Snort Signature ID 1807 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0421 
Description 
IIS 4.0 allows local users to bypass the "User cannot change 
password" policy for Windows NT by directly calling .htr 
password changing programs in the /iisadmpwd directory, 
including (1) aexp2.htr, (2) aexp2b.htr, (3) aexp3.htr , or (4) 
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aexp4.htr. 
Snort Signature ID 1487 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0649 
Description 
Multiple buffer overflows in SQL Server 2000 Resolution 
Service allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or 
execute arbitrary code via UDP packets to port 1434 in which 
(1) a 0x04 byte causes the SQL Monitor thread to generate a 
long registry key name, or (2) a 0x08 byte with a long string 
causes heap corruption. 
Snort Signature ID 2050 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-0682 
Description 
Cross-site scripting vulnerability in Apache Tomcat 4.0.3 
allows remote attackers to execute script as other web users 
via script in a URL with the /servlet/ mapping, which does 
not filter the script when an exception is thrown by the 
servlet. 
Snort Signature ID 1827 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-1142 
Description 
Heap-based buffer overflow in the Remote Data Services 
(RDS) component of Microsoft Data Access Components 
(MDAC) 2.1 through 2.6, and Internet Explorer 5.01 through 
6.0, allows remote attackers to execute code via a malformed 
HTTP request to the Data Stub. 
Snort Signature ID 1970 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2002-1232 
Description 
Memory leak in ypdb_open in yp_db.c for ypserv before 2.5 
in the NIS package 3.9 and earlier allows remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large 
number of requests for a map that does not exist. 
Snort Signature ID 590 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2003-0028 
Description 
Integer overflow in the xdrmem_getbytes() function, and 
possibly other functions, of XDR (external data 
representation) libraries derived from SunRPC, including 
libnsl, libc, glibc, and dietlibc, allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via certain integer values in length 
fields, a different vulnerability than CAN-2002-0391. 
Snort Signature ID 2092 
Tool used Nessus 
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CVE Name CAN-2003-0109 
Description 
Buffer overflow in ntdll.dll, as used by WebDAV on 
Windows 2000, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary 
code.via a long request to IIS 5.0. 
Snort Signature ID 2091 
Tool used Nessus  
 
CVE Name CAN-2003-0118 
Description 
SQL injection vulnerability in the Document Tracking and 
Administration (DTA) website of Microsoft BizTalk Server 
2000 and 2002 allows remote attackers to execute operating 
system commands via a request to (1) rawdocdata.asp or (2) 
RawCustomSearchField.asp containing an embedded SQL 
statement. 
Snort Signature ID 2133 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2003-0227 / CAN-2003-0349 
Description 
Some versions of IIS shipped with a default file, nsiislog.dll, 
within the /scripts directory. Nessus has determined that the 
remote host has the file installed.  The NSIISLOG.dll CGI 
may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on this 
host, through a buffer overflow. 
Snort Signature ID 2129 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2003-0377 
Description 
SQL injection vulnerability in the web-based administration 
interface for iisPROTECT 2.2-r4, and possibly earlier 
versions, allows remote attackers to insert arbitrary SQL and 
execute code via certain variables, as demonstrated using the 
GroupName variable in SiteAdmin.ASP. 
Snort Signature ID 2130 
Tool used Nikto, Shadow Security Scanner 
 
CVE Name CAN-2003-0605 
Description 
The RPC DCOM interface in Windows 2000 SP3 and SP4 
allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash), 
and local attackers to use the DoS to hijack the epmapper pipe 
to gain privileges, via certain messages to the 
__RemoteGetClassObject interface that cause a NULL 
pointer to be passed to the PerformScmStage function. 
Snort Signature ID 2251 
Tool used Nessus 
 
CVE Name CAN-2003-0818 
Description Multiple integer overflows in Microsoft ASN.1 library (MSASN1.DLL), as used in LSASS.EXE, CRYPT32.DLL, 
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and other Microsoft executables and libraries on Windows 
NT 4.0, 2000, and XP, allow remote attackers to execute 
arbitrary code via ASN.1 BER encodings with very large 
length fields that cause arbitrary heap data to be overwritten. 
Snort Signature ID 2383, 2386 
Tool used Nessus  
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Tables of raw data obtained after the test step is given this section. For the 
results of the 3-layer MLP networks, first column of the table shows the architecture of 
the neural network, while first row of the table represents the identity of the neural 
network, as 10 neural networks were generated for each of the neural network 
architecture. Reason for generating 10 neural networks for each of the neural network 
architecture is to avoid poor performances due to the bad initialization of the neural 
network weights. 
 For the results of the 4-layer MLP networks, first column of the table represents 
the number of nodes in input, first and second hidden layers of the neural network 
architecture, while first row of the table represents number of nodes in the third hidden 
layer and in the output layer. Intersection of a row header and a column header 
represents the number of false positives of a neural network whose architecture can be 
obtained by joining row header and column header. For instance, intersection of the row 
header of 7-5-5 and column header of 5-1 represents the false positives of the neural 
network whose architecture is 7-5-5-5-1. As managing whole neural networks would be 
a troublesome task and training periods would take long, 4-layer backpropagation 
networks were not re-initialized. 
 
Table B.1. Number of false positives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 1 124 140 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 
7-5-10-1 9 20 60 4 0 110 17 0 46 144 
7-5-15-1 1 0 18 0 1 53 9 0 15 1 
7-5-20-1 0 0 0 0 67 6 2 6 187 0 
7-5-25-1 0 4 139 0 31 0 1 62 0 1 
7-10-5-1 0 64 0 133 0 12 35 13 72 0 
7-10-10-1 14 82 12 0 0 19 1 24 13 1 
7-10-15-1 64 1 1 0 0 0 15 60 0 1 
7-10-20-1 1 9 99 0 19 14 0 4 1 0 
7-10-25-1 0 1 0 1 16 6 23 14 1 1 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
7-15-5-1 27 0 16 65 1 0 0 0 0 39 
7-15-10-1 0 0 10 62 7 24 0 61 0 0 
7-15-15-1 0 1 0 1 2 1 94 1 1 0 
7-15-20-1 0 0 61 6 13 76 11 0 1 16 
7-15-25-1 159 2 0 1 0 93 1 200 0 1 
7-20-5-1 0 1 1 0 104 76 40 2 0 0 
7-20-10-1 0 15 1 18 7 0 9 1 1 1 
7-20-15-1 7 57 21 23 1 0 1 0 27 9 
7-20-20-1 23 15 14 1 0 2 16 1 0 0 
7-20-25-1 0 1 1 1 0 3 18 2 3 1 
7-25-5-1 8 0 45 1 0 1 1 1 1 61 
7-25-10-1 0 0 62 1 0 0 73 2 1 0 
7-25-15-1 8 0 1 61 1 56 74 1 3 0 
7-25-20-1 51 0 16 1 11 3 10 1 0 82 
7-25-25-1 1 2 1 1 14 10 0 1 36 18 
 
Table B.2. Number of false negatives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 967 951 970 971 971 329 971 967 971 560 
7-5-10-1 329 329 551 557 350 656 504 971 656 644 
7-5-15-1 330 971 971 552 329 646 868 971 642 330 
7-5-20-1 645 971 550 971 531 971 332 971 650 971 
7-5-25-1 348 223 261 656 971 330 329 245 652 656 
7-10-5-1 656 330 338 551 656 329 971 551 339 656 
7-10-10-1 638 326 647 645 329 970 327 971 331 329 
7-10-15-1 437 329 329 553 329 330 971 338 536 325 
7-10-20-1 327 227 329 350 329 239 329 261 329 971 
7-10-25-1 226 330 656 329 656 329 325 329 329 329 
7-15-5-1 971 656 326 326 356 326 329 335 329 596 
7-15-10-1 644 325 329 323 329 329 329 140 329 330 
7-15-15-1 560 329 329 330 242 329 333 329 329 329 
7-15-20-1 655 329 330 329 329 224 226 331 326 328 
7-15-25-1 248 329 326 254 329 176 314 215 326 246 
7-20-5-1 224 329 325 656 534 222 328 551 971 325 
7-20-10-1 329 226 329 329 325 329 329 329 329 329 
7-20-15-1 326 316 226 325 329 329 227 253 329 245 
7-20-20-1 325 226 258 329 326 327 329 326 329 329 
7-20-25-1 323 233 325 329 326 329 234 326 326 325 
7-25-5-1 178 239 329 329 330 325 325 301 350 551 
7-25-10-1 227 226 224 325 553 325 329 329 329 247 
7-25-15-1 226 329 326 237 330 213 226 226 326 326 
7-25-20-1 323 329 325 226 194 326 277 329 326 279 
7-25-25-1 327 329 325 329 236 329 329 329 226 186 
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Table B.3. Number of false positives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 5 13 18 9 11 10 10 8 0 107 
7-5-10-1 1 2 9450 17 0 17 69 28 70 65 
7-5-15-1 19 9450 9 23 17 7 52 29 10 9450 
7-5-20-1 36 9450 26 8 3 18 3 13 5 14 
7-5-25-1 4 8 4 20 37 0 30 9 17 14 
7-10-5-1 6 1 1 0 9 0 3 14 2 8 
7-10-10-1 1 16 15 1 0 9 8 17 4 9450 
7-10-15-1 1 3 4 9 4 0 17 0 2 0 
7-10-20-1 5 2 3 14 12 2 17 13 3 5 
7-10-25-1 6 1 7 0 18 0 20 13 11 6 
7-15-5-1 0 6 13 7 3 0 1 4 0 0 
7-15-10-1 6 2498 0 2 0 6 3 0 7 0 
7-15-15-1 0 0 2 9 0 3 0 4 5 0 
7-15-20-1 4 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 
7-15-25-1 3 3 0 4 0 3 2 0 1 2 
7-20-5-1 3 1 0 0 1 11 9 0 0 1 
7-20-10-1 3 0 6 0 9450 0 0 0 0 2 
7-20-15-1 1 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 9 0 
7-20-20-1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
7-20-25-1 3 0 0 0 1 161 2 1 0 1 
7-25-5-1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
7-25-10-1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
7-25-15-1 1 0 2 1 0 0 8 0 1 0 
7-25-20-1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-25-25-1 3 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 
 
Table B.4. Number of false negatives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 23 16 1 17 13 186 22 13 7 247 
7-5-10-1 11 1 0 88 866 7 175 49 22 228 
7-5-15-1 74 0 16 4 13 6 114 24 15 0 
7-5-20-1 99 0 16 18 11 92 154 75 2 99 
7-5-25-1 13 10 7 13 87 13 22 10 7 14 
7-10-5-1 23 20 7 0 8 17 20 323 21 13 
7-10-10-1 14 656 1 1 0 0 7 7 13 0 
7-10-15-1 2 1 2 15 1 7 1 1 1 0 
7-10-20-1 1 1 7 8 6 6 13 4 1 15 
7-10-25-1 8 1 0 0 14 0 6 7 1 8 
7-15-5-1 800 1 16 2 188 13 2 19 0 13 
7-15-10-1 1 101 0 0 0 134 1 0 8 6 
7-15-15-1 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 
7-15-20-1 7 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 7 0 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table B.4 (cont.) 
7-15-25-1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 0 0 
7-20-5-1 6 0 0 6 9 7 7 13 0 0 
7-20-10-1 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7-20-15-1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 326 1 
7-20-20-1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 
7-20-25-1 7 0 1 0 0 66 1 0 0 0 
7-25-5-1 6 7 1 0 0 6 7 0 7 7 
7-25-10-1 1 1 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 7 
7-25-15-1 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 
7-25-20-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-25-25-1 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 
 
Table B.5. Number of false positives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 0 0 61 0 133 
7-5-10 67 1 0 0 0 
7-5-15 7 12 4 46 0 
7-5-20 0 135 14 77 0 
7-5-25 0 1 106 1 25 
7-10-5 1 1 116 1 4 
7-10-10 0 32 18 5 78 
7-10-15 5 27 7 62 0 
7-10-20 69 1 0 1 1 
7-10-25 64 41 0 1 1 
7-15-5 1 1 1 0 65 
7-15-10 1 103 64 3 0 
7-15-15 1 18 17 62 1 
7-15-20 95 1 62 0 0 
7-15-25 1 15 0 0 18 
7-20-5 7 13 11 32 2 
7-20-10 2 92 0 10 49 
7-20-15 0 14 1 0 12 
7-20-20 11 12 1 0 1 
7-20-25 28 16 19 0 1 
7-25-5 116 0 16 1 47 
7-25-10 1 0 0 0 1 
7-25-15 0 15 17 55 30 
7-25-20 0 1 10 1 63 
7-25-25 17 2 0 1 11 
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Table B.6. Number of false negatives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 971 971 551 329 655 
7-5-10 329 656 326 564 971 
7-5-15 971 655 328 963 935 
7-5-20 656 218 322 326 644 
7-5-25 971 226 330 224 307 
7-10-5 329 644 219 213 320 
7-10-10 329 329 213 652 224 
7-10-15 330 312 329 224 325 
7-10-20 557 553 329 242 329 
7-10-25 224 649 652 328 325 
7-15-5 656 329 311 226 224 
7-15-10 336 329 312 329 323 
7-15-15 329 343 277 323 224 
7-15-20 226 224 245 226 245 
7-15-25 329 325 327 226 325 
7-20-5 331 199 329 215 550 
7-20-10 656 329 318 329 304 
7-20-15 329 322 276 330 242 
7-20-20 326 160 329 224 242 
7-20-25 226 325 329 329 656 
7-25-5 329 330 326 226 86 
7-25-10 329 329 329 326 224 
7-25-15 635 224 193 325 327 
7-25-20 326 309 326 276 137 
7-25-25 198 321 329 245 95 
 
Table B.7. Number of false positives for 4-Layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 9450 24 11 3 2 
7-5-10 18 32 20 19 1 
7-5-15 0 82 4 9 1 
7-5-20 0 11 1 3 14 
7-5-25 0 7 1 0 9 
7-10-5 0 0 0 4 1 
7-10-10 3 0 1 0 0 
7-10-15 0 0 3 0 0 
7-10-20 0 0 0 0 1 
7-10-25 0 9450 0 0 10 
7-15-5 1 0 222 0 19 
7-15-10 0 0 11 0 0 
7-15-15 0 3 0 0 1 
7-15-20 0 0 0 0 3 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table B.7 (cont.) 
7-15-25 0 0 0 1 0 
7-20-5 0 0 0 9 0 
7-20-10 0 0 0 0 0 
7-20-15 0 0 0 0 0 
7-20-20 0 0 3 0 3 
7-20-25 0 0 0 0 0 
7-25-5 14 0 1 0 0 
7-25-10 0 0 3 0 0 
7-25-15 3 0 0 0 0 
7-25-20 0 0 9450 0 0 
7-25-25 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Table B.8. Number of false negatives for 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 0 94 16 18 22 
7-5-10 3 191 7 27 6 
7-5-15 8 45 9 1 6 
7-5-20 1 14 7 0 162 
7-5-25 0 1 0 1 6 
7-10-5 1 6 7 157 7 
7-10-10 2 6 0 0 0 
7-10-15 6 1 0 0 0 
7-10-20 6 0 0 1 0 
7-10-25 13 0 6 1 1 
7-15-5 329 0 81 6 270 
7-15-10 1 0 0 0 0 
7-15-15 0 1 0 0 0 
7-15-20 6 0 1 0 11 
7-15-25 0 0 0 13 1 
7-20-5 1 0 0 1 1 
7-20-10 0 0 0 1 0 
7-20-15 1 0 0 1 1 
7-20-20 0 0 71 0 6 
7-20-25 0 6 0 0 1 
7-25-5 870 1 0 1 0 
7-25-10 0 0 6 0 0 
7-25-15 1 0 0 0 0 
7-25-20 0 1 0 0 0 
7-25-25 13 0 0 0 0 
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Table B.9. Number of false positives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 4233 4233 0 0 0 4233 4233 0 4233 0 
7-5-10-1 0 0 4233 0 4233 4233 0 0 4233 0 
7-5-15-1 4233 0 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 4233 
7-5-20-1 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 0 
7-5-25-1 4233 4233 0 4233 0 4233 4233 0 4233 4233 
7-10-5-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 4233 
7-10-10-1 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 0 0 
7-10-15-1 4233 0 4233 4233 0 0 0 4233 0 0 
7-10-20-1 0 0 0 4233 0 4233 0 4233 0 0 
7-10-25-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 4233 
7-15-5-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 
7-15-10-1 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 0 0 4233 0 
7-15-15-1 0 0 0 0 4233 0 4233 4233 0 0 
7-15-20-1 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 0 4233 0 
7-15-25-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 0 0 
7-20-5-1 0 0 4233 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 4233 
7-20-10-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-20-15-1 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 0 0 
7-20-20-1 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 0 0 
7-20-25-1 0 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 0 0 
7-25-5-1 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 0 4233 4233 0 
7-25-10-1 0 0 4233 0 4233 0 4233 0 0 4233 
7-25-15-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 0 
7-25-20-1 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 
7-25-25-1 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 
 
Table B.10. Number of false negatives for 3-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 73 46 16 73 73 63 63 73 73 57 
7-5-10-1 0 36 73 30 73 33 0 73 16 6 
7-5-15-1 63 73 73 63 63 63 73 73 36 63 
7-5-20-1 63 73 73 73 63 73 43 73 73 73 
7-5-25-1 73 36 63 73 73 73 63 63 73 46 
7-10-5-1 73 73 63 33 73 63 73 73 63 73 
7-10-10-1 63 63 73 63 63 73 63 73 73 30 
7-10-15-1 73 63 63 73 63 63 73 63 73 36 
7-10-20-1 30 63 63 73 63 57 63 67 73 73 
7-10-25-1 57 36 73 63 73 36 57 63 63 63 
7-15-5-1 73 73 63 36 63 63 73 73 63 63 
7-15-10-1 57 63 63 36 63 63 63 57 73 67 
7-15-15-1 63 30 27 36 0 65 73 63 63 63 
7-15-20-1 73 27 36 36 73 63 63 43 63 0 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table B.10 (cont.) 
7-15-25-1 27 30 63 57 63 63 63 57 36 0 
7-20-5-1 63 63 36 73 73 30 0 73 73 63 
7-20-10-1 36 36 36 63 36 63 46 57 65 63 
7-20-15-1 63 59 57 57 36 73 63 6 71 30 
7-20-20-1 8 63 36 63 63 63 63 57 63 63 
7-20-25-1 57 36 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 0 
7-25-5-1 73 33 67 63 73 36 63 7 63 73 
7-25-10-1 57 63 36 36 73 36 36 63 63 73 
7-25-15-1 36 63 63 73 63 36 36 30 30 63 
7-25-20-1 63 63 63 73 36 31 0 63 57 63 
7-25-25-1 30 63 36 63 30 65 36 63 73 57 
 
Table B.11. Number of false positives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 
7-5-10-1 4233 0 4233 0 4233 4233 4233 0 0 4233 
7-5-15-1 4233 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 0 
7-5-20-1 4233 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 0 0 
7-5-25-1 0 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 4233 0 0 
7-10-5-1 4233 4233 0 4233 4233 0 4233 4233 0 4233 
7-10-10-1 4233 4233 0 4233 0 4233 4233 0 0 4233 
7-10-15-1 0 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 4233 
7-10-20-1 4233 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 4233 4233 
7-10-25-1 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 0 
7-15-5-1 4233 4233 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 
7-15-10-1 4233 4233 4233 4233 4233 0 0 4233 4233 0 
7-15-15-1 0 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 4233 
7-15-20-1 4233 0 0 0 0 0 4233 0 0 0 
7-15-25-1 4233 4233 4233 0 0 4233 4233 0 4233 0 
7-20-5-1 4233 0 4233 0 4233 4233 4233 4233 4233 0 
7-20-10-1 0 4233 0 0 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 
7-20-15-1 0 4233 4233 0 0 4233 0 4233 0 4233 
7-20-20-1 0 4233 4233 0 0 0 4233 0 4233 0 
7-20-25-1 0 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 0 0 0 4233 
7-25-5-1 0 4233 4233 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 
7-25-10-1 0 0 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 0 4233 0 
7-25-15-1 4233 4233 4233 4233 4233 0 0 4233 4233 4233 
7-25-20-1 4233 0 0 0 4233 4233 4233 4233 4233 4233 
7-25-25-1 4233 4233 4233 0 0 0 0 4233 4233 4233 
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Table B.12. Number of false negatives for 3-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7-5-5-1 10 57 30 36 63 30 63 65 30 67 
7-5-10-1 57 30 0 65 73 63 73 73 63 36 
7-5-15-1 0 0 67 57 30 30 36 73 0 0 
7-5-20-1 36 0 36 30 24 36 73 4 57 73 
7-5-25-1 30 1 59 46 27 30 36 63 57 30 
7-10-5-1 73 57 67 37 57 36 57 30 30 36 
7-10-10-1 8 73 57 73 57 0 30 36 50 0 
7-10-15-1 36 30 0 30 30 30 27 63 57 10 
7-10-20-1 0 0 30 0 0 6 0 63 0 0 
7-10-25-1 27 36 0 30 30 0 30 63 30 36 
7-15-5-1 73 30 30 0 63 67 30 30 73 30 
7-15-10-1 30 73 10 27 57 30 36 46 30 57 
7-15-15-1 57 18 0 27 30 63 27 30 38 57 
7-15-20-1 57 57 27 73 27 18 65 63 30 30 
7-15-25-1 0 30 6 30 0 57 0 0 30 0 
7-20-5-1 57 57 57 67 30 63 30 63 36 30 
7-20-10-1 30 63 30 30 0 30 63 57 30 57 
7-20-15-1 0 30 0 30 36 0 30 57 63 30 
7-20-20-1 57 30 27 36 8 30 0 30 29 30 
7-20-25-1 6 30 0 27 27 57 27 57 6 30 
7-25-5-1 30 36 6 30 57 30 36 33 36 46 
7-25-10-1 0 0 30 30 30 57 27 63 63 0 
7-25-15-1 63 30 0 27 0 57 30 59 6 0 
7-25-20-1 30 36 27 63 0 57 0 57 30 30 
7-25-25-1 63 0 30 30 67 73 57 18 57 0 
 
Table B.13. Number of false positives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 0 0 0 0 4233 
7-5-10 0 0 0 0 0 
7-5-15 0 4233 0 0 0 
7-5-20 0 0 0 0 0 
7-5-25 0 0 0 0 0 
7-10-5 0 0 4233 4233 0 
7-10-10 0 0 4233 0 0 
7-10-15 0 0 0 4233 0 
7-10-20 0 0 0 0 0 
7-10-25 0 4233 0 0 0 
7-15-5 0 0 0 0 4233 
7-15-10 0 0 0 4233 0 
7-15-15 0 0 0 4233 4233 
7-15-20 0 0 0 4233 0 
7-15-25 0 4233 0 0 0 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table B.13 (cont.) 
7-20-5 0 0 0 0 0 
7-20-10 4233 0 0 0 0 
7-20-15 0 0 0 0 0 
7-20-20 4233 4233 0 0 0 
7-20-25 0 4233 0 0 4233 
7-25-5 0 0 0 4233 4233 
7-25-10 4233 0 0 0 4233 
7-25-15 0 4233 4233 0 4233 
7-25-20 0 4233 0 0 0 
7-25-25 4233 0 0 0 0 
 
Table B.14. Number of false negatives for 4-layer backpropagation networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 73 73 73 63 6 
7-5-10 57 73 63 63 73 
7-5-15 37 46 63 57 73 
7-5-20 73 30 36 36 63 
7-5-25 73 36 27 36 57 
7-10-5 63 63 57 73 30 
7-10-10 30 30 6 73 63 
7-10-15 63 30 36 33 63 
7-10-20 0 73 6 57 57 
7-10-25 63 73 65 36 30 
7-15-5 46 36 0 73 63 
7-15-10 63 63 63 63 36 
7-15-15 63 63 63 36 36 
7-15-20 33 63 63 73 57 
7-15-25 0 30 63 63 67 
7-20-5 63 63 73 63 73 
7-20-10 73 57 73 71 36 
7-20-15 36 63 0 63 30 
7-20-20 54 63 63 73 30 
7-20-25 36 63 57 63 73 
7-25-5 36 46 57 36 0 
7-25-10 6 36 63 63 30 
7-25-15 57 63 57 63 36 
7-25-20 36 30 36 6 36 
7-25-25 6 30 63 63 63 
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Table B.15. Number of false positives for 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 4233 4233 0 0 4233 
7-5-10 0 4233 0 4233 4233 
7-5-15 0 0 0 4233 4233 
7-5-20 0 4233 0 4233 0 
7-5-25 0 4233 0 0 0 
7-10-5 0 4233 4233 0 4233 
7-10-10 0 4233 4233 4233 0 
7-10-15 4233 0 4233 4233 0 
7-10-20 0 0 4233 4233 0 
7-10-25 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 
7-15-5 0 4233 4233 4233 0 
7-15-10 4233 4233 0 0 0 
7-15-15 0 4233 4233 0 4233 
7-15-20 0 4233 0 4233 0 
7-15-25 0 4233 4233 4233 0 
7-20-5 4233 4233 0 0 4233 
7-20-10 0 4233 4233 0 4233 
7-20-15 0 0 0 0 0 
7-20-20 4233 0 4233 0 4233 
7-20-25 4233 4233 4233 0 0 
7-25-5 0 0 0 0 4233 
7-25-10 4233 4233 0 0 4233 
7-25-15 0 0 0 4233 4233 
7-25-20 4233 0 4233 4233 4233 
7-25-25 4233 4233 4233 0 4233 
 
Table B.16. Number of false negatives for 4-layer Levenberg-Marquardt networks. 
 
 -5-1 -10-1 -15-1 -20-1 -25-1 
7-5-5 0 36 52 0 36 
7-5-10 30 73 30 40 57 
7-5-15 63 30 0 57 57 
7-5-20 73 30 53 30 36 
7-5-25 67 63 40 30 36 
7-10-5 1 57 31 36 36 
7-10-10 57 57 57 40 0 
7-10-15 36 57 0 63 30 
7-10-20 30 30 0 57 57 
7-10-25 57 0 57 0 57 
7-15-5 63 0 30 57 33 
7-15-10 57 33 57 63 30 
7-15-15 57 57 57 31 30 
7-15-20 57 30 57 30 6 
(cont. on next page) 
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Table B.16 (cont.) 
7-15-25 27 57 63 63 57 
7-20-5 63 46 30 36 36 
7-20-10 57 37 30 57 30 
7-20-15 30 0 30 27 27 
7-20-20 0 33 40 57 30 
7-20-25 0 33 59 0 57 
7-25-5 73 30 52 0 57 
7-25-10 57 57 30 30 30 
7-25-15 57 51 27 57 27 
7-25-20 57 38 0 63 67 
7-25-25 30 30 33 0 27 
 
